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THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO DUMPING
FROM CAPITALIST AND SOCIALIST
ECONOMIES-SUBSTANTIVE PREMISES,
AND RESTRUCTURED PROCEDURES
AFTER THE 1967 GATT CODE*
Robert A. Anthonyt
Dumping consists of selling abroad at less than "normal" or "fair"
value. In the typical case a producer, for any one of a number of
motives, sells in a foreign market at a price lower than that at which
he sells in his home market or other primary market.' This practice is
* This article is adapted from a paper presented to a conference of American and
Yugoslav international and commercial lawyers, sponsored by the Association of American
Law Schools and the Institute of Comparative Law of Belgrade University, at Zagreb,
Yugoslavia, on July 2, 1968. The author wishes to express his warm gratitude, for their
valuable comments and suggestions, to James C. Conner, Esq., of the International
Finance Corporation; Tom E. Davis, Professor of Economics and Chairman of the
Department of Economics, Cornell University; Peter Buck Feller, Esq., of the United
States Department of the Treasury; and Alfred E. Kahn, Robert Julius Thorne Professor
of Economics, Cornell University.
t Professor of Law and Director of International Legal Studies, Cornell University.
B.A. 1953, Yale University; B.A. Juris., 1955, MA., Oxford University; LL.B. 1957,
Stanford University.
1 In economic terms, dumping is selling abroad at discounts unjustified by cost
differentials. The United States Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-73 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Act] speaks of sales "at less than . . . fair value." Act § 201(a),
42 Stat. 11 (1921), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964). Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. pt. 5, A3 (1947), T.I.AS. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as GATTJ, defines dumping as the process "by which products of one
country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal
value of the products." 62 Stat. 3682 (1948), formerly 61 Stat. pt. 5, A3 (1947). A fastidious
and widely accepted definition is offered by the best-known student of dumping: "price-
discrimination between national markets." J. ViNER, DuMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTER-
NATioNAL TRADE 3 (1923, reprinted 1966) [hereinafter cited as VINER]. The Viner definition
is unsatisfactory for present purposes, since it casts the opprobrium of the word "dis-
crimination" in the wrong direction, and, further, embraces "reverse dumping" (sale at
a lower price at home than abroad), ViNER 4-7, which is irrelevant to the present study.
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feared and condemned because it may unfairly injure other producers
who sell in the national market where the goods are dumped, and
because it may impair normal conditions of competition among those
producers.
Like other national antidumping laws that observe the standards
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,2 the United States law
is designed to defend domestic industry against injury from the impor-
tation of foreign merchandise at differentially low prices.3 Accordingly,
there are two prime elements that must be found before remedial action
can be taken: differentially low prices ("at less than fair value") of the
imported goods, and injury to a domestic industry. Where both are
established, a special equalizing duty is imposed.4
Dumping takes its most damaging form when "predatory" sales
are systematically made at reduced export prices to forestall, reduce or
eliminate competition in a particular national market, so that higher
The critical characteristic of dumping, as it concerns us, exists when the price for sale
to the importing market (e.g., the United States) is lower than the price (or value otherwise
computed) in the exporter's other primary market (e.g., his home market).
On the economics of dumping generally, see VINER; G. IABEmz.x, TnE THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 296-324 (rev. Eng. transl. 1950) [hereinafter cited as HABEnLER]; C.
KINDLE rRGER, INTERNATONAL ECONOMIS 266-78 (3d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as
KINDLEBEFtGER].
2 Article VI of the GATT "recognizes" that dumping "is to be condemned if it
causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a
contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry." 62
Stat. 3682 (1948). The provisions of GATT art. VI have been extensively elaborated by
the International Antidumping Code, signed at Geneva on June 30, 1967 as part of the
Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,962 (1967), T.I.A.S. No.
(effective July 1, 1968), 6 INT'L LEGAL MATrmALS 920 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Code],
discussed extensively in part II of this article. See Comment, The Kennedy Round GATT
Anti-Dumping Code, 29 U. Pm. L. REv. 482 (1968). Regarding pre-Code European
antidumping laws, see Section of International and Comparative Law, Analyses of the
Anitidumping Laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, and the United
Kingdom, 10 A.B.A. INT'L & Comar. L. BuLL. 14 (Dec. 1965).
3 The fundamental plan of the law is found in § 201(a) of the Act, which reads in
part as follows:
Whenever the Secretary of the Treasury ... determines that a class or kind
of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States or
elsewhere at less than its fair value, he shall so advise the United States Tariff
Commission, and the said Commission shall determine within three months
thereafter whether an industry in the United States is being or is likely to be
injured, or is prevented from being established, by reason of the importation
of such merchandise into the United States.
68 Stat. 1138 (1954), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964), formerly 42 Stat. 11 (1921).
4 Act § 202(a), 19 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1964). "[W]hile the duty resembles a tariff in form,
on a functional level it more closely resembles a sanction intended to punish or deter a
particular undesirable act .... " Comment, The Antidumping Act-Tariff or Antitrust
Law?, 74 YALE L. J. 707, 709 (1965).
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prices can thereafter be charged in that market.5 The first explicit
American antidumping law, a criminal statute enacted in 1916,6 was
addressed to this kind of dumping, "done with the intent of destroying
or injuring an industry in the United States, or of preventing the estab-
lishment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or monop-
olizing" trade But dumping occasioned by non-predatory motives-
for example, to relieve random surpluses on the home market8 or to
maintain factories at capacity production 9-may nevertheless have
injurious effects in the national market where the goods are sold. 10
When a new American antidumping law was enacted in 1921,11 its
principal legislative purpose may have continued to be the prevention
of predatory dumping,12 but the requirement of intent to injure was
removed and the reach of the law was extended to all sales below fair
value by reason of which an industry in the United States "is being or
is likely to be injured."'13 The Antidumping Act of 1921 provided for
the administrative assessment of equalizing duties rather than the use
5 VINER 26. The pre-empted competitors, of course, may be other exporters into the
national market as well as domestic producers. The periodic or systematic character of
this form of dumping has led it to be termed "intermittent," to distinguish it from the
less-damaging "sporadic" or occasional dumping of surpluses on the one hand and from
"permanent" or "long-run" dumping on the other. See VINER 23-31, 110-26, 132-33;
Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United States Counter-
vailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 44, 46-48 (1958).
6 Revenue Act of 1916, § 801, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1964). While this provision remains in
force, it "has been virtually a dead letter... largely because of the problems of proving
the requisite intent and the comparative attractiveness of proceeding under the 1921 act."
Prosterman, Withholding of Appraisement under the United States Anti-Dumping Act:
Protectionism or Unfair-Competition Law?, 41 WAsH. L. REV. 315, 316 n.4 (1966).
7 Revenue Act of 1916, § 801, 39 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1964). In the years pre-
ceding the 1916 legislation, the United States had been perceived to be the victim of
extensive predatory dumping. See VINER 242-43; U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, INFORMATION
CONCERNING DUMPING AND UNFAIR FOREIGN COMPETITION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA's ANT-DUMPING LAW (1919), reproduced in L. EBB, REGULATION AND PROTECTION
or INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 836-39 (1964).
8 Viner regarded the potential injury from such sporadic dumping as relatively
unimportant. VINER 245, 139-40.
9 See pp. 172-77 infra; VINER 27-28, 31.
10 See VINER 140, 146-47; Baler, Substantive Interpretations Under the Antidumping
Act and the Foreign Trade Policy of the United States, 17 STAN. L. REv. 409, 448-50
(1965).
11 Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-73 (1964).
12 See the argument based on legislative history advanced by A. Coudert, The
Application of the United States Antidumping Law in the Light of a Liberal Trade
Policy, 65 CoLms. L. REv. 189, 191-92 (1965). But see Cast Iron Soil Pipe from Poland,
32 Fed. Reg. 12,925, 12,927-28 (Tariff Comm'n 1967) (legislative history discussed in
concurring opinion of Comm'r Clubb).
I3 Act § 201(a), 42 Stat. 11 (1921), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
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of criminal penalties.14 It is in that Act, as amended and as supple-
mented by Treasury regulations, 5 that the basic American legislation
on this subject continues to be found.'8
I wish to consider the Antidumping Act of 1921 in three aspects,
as to which I believe it is fair to say the scholarly literature is either
scanty or at least partly out of date. The first section of this paper will
explore the economic premises of the law: why should a higher duty be
assessed upon dumped goods than upon other similar goods imported
at a similar price? In the second part I will briefly examine the proce-
dures and the legal criteria observed in determining whether a dump-
ing duty shall be imposed, with particular attention to the GATT
Antidumping Code of 1967 and the new regulations promulgated by
the Treasury in 1968 to conform procedures under the American law
to that Code. The final section probes the nature and theory of the
price comparison inquiry, by considering the manner in which that
inquiry should be pursued in cases where the price of the exported
product has been affected by measures of state interference in or control
over the exporting economy. This question is examined most closely
with respect to the products of Yugoslavia, whose economy fits neither
the capitalist model the draftsmen of the Antidumping Act seem to
14 Id. § 202(a), 19 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1964).
15 The current Antidumping Regulations, 33 Fed. Reg. 8244 (June 1, 1968), effective
July 1, 1968, form a new Part 53 of the Customs Regulations, 19 C.F.R.; see note 53 infra.
16 The export price discrimination that may result from a system of governmental
(or private) subsidies-sometimes called "bounty dumping"--is dealt with by separate
legislation in the American scheme of import regulation. The anti-bounty statute imposes
a "countervailing duty" in the amount of the bounty or subsidy found to have been
bestowed upon the imported goods. Tariff Act of 1930, § 803, 46 Stat. 687, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1303 (1964); for history (antedating antidumping legislation), see Ehrenhaft, supra note
5, at 52-53. Although the practice of export subsidization can result in sale abroad at
lower prices than in the home market and thus can present economic effects similar to
dumping (see VINmR 126-28, 134-35), American law responds quite differently to subsidized
imports. Neither of the two essential components of an antidumping finding is material:
sale below home-market price need not be shown, and there is no requirement of injury
to a domestic industry. (The statute's non-conformity to the GATT's requirement of
finding threatened or actual injury to a domestic industry, art. VI(6), is permitted because
the American statute antedated GATT. See note 61 infra.) See generally Ehrenhaft,
supra note 5, at 54-58; EBB, supra note 7, at 824-36; F. Davis, The Regulation and Control
of Foreign Trade, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1428, 1444-46 (1966). Although the countervailing duty
statute has been little used in the seventy years of its existence, SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE,
90th Cong., 2d Sess, COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON IXGISLATIVE OvE sIiT RFviEw or U.S.
TRADE PoLIcIy 77 (2 vols. Comm. Print 1968) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM], there are
indications that the administration intends to employ it more readily than in the past.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 27, 1968, at 1, col. 2 (city ed.); Roth, The Future of American
Trade Policy, 59 DEP'T STAT BULL. 100, 101 (1968).
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have had in mind nor the strict socialist paradigm of which recent
Treasury decisions have taken some account.
I
THE ECONOMIC PREMISES OF THE ANTmUMPiNG Aar
It should be clear that the American antidumping laws present no
barrier to the importation of goods on the ground merely that those
goods undersell domestic products, even where domestic producers are
thereby injured.17 Such low-priced imports are in principle welcomed
under the liberal American trade policy,' 8 and in general are restricted
(if at all) only by conventional tariffs.' 9 But if imported goods that are
differentially priced undersell domestic products and thereby injure
domestic producers,20 the antidumping duty may be imposed.2 '
17 The Antidumping Act is designed, not to restrict competition from imports
as such, but ... to bolster the forces supporting a healthy competition within
the domestic economy. . . . Price competition reflecting improved technology,
increased efficiency, and superior types of marketing--each redounding to the
benefit of the consuming public and each contributing to the vigor of the
national economy-is compatible with the legislation here concerned.
Portland Cement from the Dominican Republic, 28 Fed. Reg. 4047 (Tariff Comm'n 1963).
18 See, e.g., Remarks of President Johnson accompanying Proclamation to Carry
Out 1967 Geneva Protocol to GATT, December 16, 1967, 58 DsP'T STATE BULL. 88 (1968);
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934, § 350(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (1964); Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, § 102(2), 19 U.S.C. § 1801(2) (1964); GATT preamble; Baler, supra
note 10, at 446-48.
19 But see Tariff Act of 1930, § 307, 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1964) (convict-made products);
Tariff Act of 1930, § 336, 19 U.S.C. § 1336 (1964) (adjustment of duties to offset low
foreign cost of production; not applicable to articles from countries with which U.S. has
a trade agreement, Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934, § 2(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1352(a)
(1964)). The "escape clause" of earlier trade agreements legislation (e.g., Trade Agree-
ment Act of 1951, ch. 141, § 6, 65 Stat. 73; Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1955,
ch. 169, § 4, 69 Stat. 164), which relieved against injury (caused by low-priced imports
that had been the subject of trade agreement concessions) only through the reimposition
of tariff or quota barriers, was restructured in 1962 to tighten the criteria of injury and
to provide "adjustment assistance" as an alternative technique of relief that does not
inhibit the low-priced imports, Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 1901
(1964).
20 Under Tariff Commission practice, injury is not found unless the dumped goods
sell in the American market at a lower price than the competitive domestic product.
Hendrick, The United States Antidumping Act, 58 Am. J. INT'L L. 914, 928-30 (1964);
Hendrick, Administration of the U.S. Antidumping Act-Procedures and Policies, in
COMPENDIUM, supra note 16, at 173-74.
21 The fact that the Treasury finds imports to be sold at less than fair value creates
no presumption of injury, which must be separately found on the evidence. Hendrick,




What considerations justify a policy that accords more restrictive
treatment to differentially-priced imports than to other imports that
may undersell the competing domestic product? Superficially, the
American consumer derives the same advantages of cheapness from the
dumped as from the non-dumped imports; thus the antidumping law
seems to depart from the free trade policy that encourages the importa-
tion of inexpensive goods. Interestingly, however, the soundest theo-
retical basis for treating dumped goods more restrictively seems to lie
in an economic doctrine that not only makes the consumer's ability
to buy cheaply the ultimate desideratum but is indeed the very premise
of the general policy favoring free trade.22 This theory-the economic
law of comparative advantage-teaches that free international competi-
tion will induce a pattern of international specialization along the lines
of relative productive efficiency, which in turn will minimize prices
throughout the international trading area involved.23 Thus, if a pro-
ducer in one country possesses natural or earned advantages that enable
him to sell more cheaply in another country than can the domestic
producers, he should be allowed to do so; the exporting producer is
fairly rewarded for his efficiency, and consumers in the importing
country get the goods at the lowest price. On the other hand, an export-
Some economists have suggested that, in certain circumstances such as those where
a domestic oligopoly maintains inflexible prices, dumping may be a needed factor to
stimulate competition and thereby to benefit consumers in the American market. See
Adams & Dirlam, Steel Imports and Vertical Oligopoly Power, 54 Am. EcoN. Rav. 626,
648-50 (1964). But cf. The Steel Import Problem, 23 STEVLWAYS, Nov.-Dec. 1967, at 2. The
important question of whether, in making its injury determination, the Tariff Commission
should "protect competition" or should "protect competitors" is beyond the scope of
the present paper. See Comment, The Antidumping Act-Tariff or Antitrust Law?, 74
YALE L. J. 707 (1965).
22 [I]f the free-trade doctrine be regarded as the positive doctrine that commerce
and industry should be kept in their natural channels and not merely the
negative doctrine that nothing be done by legislatures to force them out of their
natural channels, it would not merely be invalid to cite the doctrine as opp6sed
to restrictions on dumping but it would be valid to argue that it calls for such
restrictions.
VINER 147. The fundamental economic policies underlying the antidumping laws have
received surprisingly little attention in the legal literature, which either ignores the
question or makes passing allusion to the idea of unfair competition.
23 On the theory of comparative advantage generally, see P. SAMUELSON, EcoNoMIc
646-51, 657-67 (7th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as S~asuaLsoN]; KiNDLEBERGER, supra note
1, at 87-105; P. ELLsWORTH, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 120-28, 144-46, 153-55 (1950);
HABELER, supra note 1, at 125-44. Obviously, considerations of national security,
protection of infant industries, maintaining employment in depressed areas and the
like will lead even the most ardent free-trading nations to protect certain domestic
industries against import competition. See ELLSWORTH, supra, at 563-85. Such considerations
may be treated as extraneous for the analysis that follows.
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ing producer should not be permitted to undersell and thereby to
injure domestic producers if he can do so only by exploiting artificial
or anticompetitive circumstances rather than by exploiting his superior
efficiency.
On these premises, the practice of dumping can be condemned for
two reasons. First, the fact that the price for export to the United States
is lower than the price the seller charges in his primary market is itself
taken as evidence that the export sales are somehow subsidized by
monopolistic profits extracted from the primary market; thus the
dumper has only an artificial and not a legitimate advantage over the
American competitors he undersells. Second, while standing to lose
the favorable prices or supplies furnished by domestic producers who
might be injured by the dumping, the American consumer gains no
assurance that the imported goods will continue to be available at the
low dumped price.
The assumption must be, of course, that the domestic producers
are efficient and vigorously competing. Then, on the above grounds, the
American consumer will be protected by an administrative technique
that protects the American producers against injury. The two counts
against dumping can be restated in comparative advantage terms: (1)
dumpers do not have an economically legitimate advantage, and/or
(2) the benefits flowing from any advantage possessed by the dumper are
temporary and unreliable. The latter point is the stronger, and will be
examined first.
In the analysis that follows, it will be assumed that the dumper
exports at a price that not only is lower than his home-market price
but also is lower than the prevailing price of the competitive domestic
product in the United States. This assumption sets the relevant condi-
tions for comparative advantage analysis, enabling us to inquire
whether the lower dumping price reflects a genuine advantage. Further,
since under Tariff Commission practice injury will be found only if
the dumped goods undersell the domestic goods, the assumption makes
the inquiry a realistic one in terms of the antidumping law's chief
requirements.
A. The Undependability of the Benefits of Dumping
Where the imported goods are not dumped but are sold to the
United States at the same price as to the home market, that uniformity
of price probably reflects more or less stable productive conditions
enabling the exporter to sell normally at that price. Presumably he is
1969]
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making money at that price; the probabilities are small that he is set-
ting an identical money-losing price (which could be maintained
only for a limited period) in both the home and the export markets.
Therefore legislative policy may fairly act on a presumption that the
supply of such uniformly-priced imported goods will be of indefinite
duration.24 Although such non-dumped imports may undersell and
thereby injure American producers, the prospect of their continued
cheapness and availability affords a reasonable prospect of long-run
benefits to consumers in the United States. It is the essence of compara-
tive advantage theory that domestic producers should have to adjust
to the foreign competition in such a situation.
25
By contrast, it can almost never be presumed that a particular
course of dumping will last more than temporarily or briefly. "[T]he
evil of dumping from the point of view of the importing country is its
uncertain duration." 26 Economists recognize the possibility of "perma-
nent" or "persistent" dumping, and concede that there would be no
economic case to be made against such a continuous flow of cheap
goods, regardless of the cause of their cheapness. 27 But "[t]here is no
practical means whereby an importing country can discriminate before-
hand between dumping which is destined to continue indefinitely
and dumping which will cease .... ,2 And since, as the analysis in the
next section will show, the situations in which an exporter can profit-
ably maintain dumping beyond the short run are few (even in declining-
cost industries), the economic pressures will militate to cut the dump-
ing short.
24 Indeed, if free-trade policy is to mean anything, there must be such a presumption.
If it were taken that even uniformly-priced goods could not be relied upon to be
available at the given price, there would be justification for imposing equalizing duties
on all goods that undersold the domestic product. Section 336 of the protectionist Tariff
Act of 1930, 19 US C. § 1336 (1964), which did roughly that, is now virtually inoperative
as a result of the reciprocal trade agreements program, see Reciprocal Trade Agreement
Act of 1934, § 2, 19 U.S.C. § 1352 (1964), and the statutory most-favored-nations prin-
ciple. See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 251, 19 U.S.C. § 1881 (1964). See also
Headnotes to Revised Tariff Schedules, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1964).
25 See ELrSWORrn, supra note 23, at 123-25, 144-46; Steel Reinforcing Bars from
Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 3840, 3841 (Tariff Comm'n 1964).
26 VINmt 139.
27 See, e.g., ViNER 138-39, 144-45; EuaswoRTr, supra note 23, at 386; HABMU.R,
supra note 1, at 314-15; Ehrenhaft, supra note 5, at 48 n.20.
28 VINER 139. Viner also stated:
Only in the case of dumping resulting from the existence of a system of official
export bounties which is strongly intrenched in national policy would it appear
to be safe for individuals in the importing country to plan their business for
the future on the assumption that the dumping will continue indefinitely and
may not suddenly cease.
Id. See note 16 supra.
[VoI. 54:159
ANTIDUMPING LAW & POLICY
It is therefore proper to erect a presumption, for the purposes of
legislative policy, that dumping will be temporary.29 The only bene-
fit of dumping-a supply of low-priced goods-should on like grounds
be presumed to be temporary and undependable. 0 Here, then, we have
the principal economic justification for the Antidumping Act. There
is no basis to say (as in the case of non-dumped imports) that the injury
inflicted upon domestic producers will be offset by a redeeming eco-
nomic advantage in the dumper that can be relied upon to maintain the
correlative benefit of cheapness that the law of comparative advantage
promises. To the contrary, comparative advantage theory in this situa-
tion argues in favor of protecting domestic competition against distur-
bance and domestic producers against injury. The domestic industry
is more readily presumed capable of maintaining low prices than is
the foreign competitor whose temporarily lower price cannot be de-
pended upon.
The issue of whether the presumption of unreliability can or
should be overcome, upon a showing that the dumping can be perma-
nent, will be considered after an examination of the variant patterns
of production costs.
While dumping of course does not cause legally-cognizable injury
in all instances, temporary dumping 1 is likely to cause economic injury
because it creates an unstable situation to which competitors in the
domestic market may not readily be able to adjust-and, indeed, should
not be expected to adjust.3 2 If the domestic industry is an efficient one
(as we must assume throughout the present analysis), the domestic
economy has an interest in keeping domestic producers engaged in
their present lines of production, rather than in requiring them to shift
29 See ViNE 146-47, 139.
80 There is a sound case, therefore, for the restriction of imports of dumped
commodities, not because such imports are cheap in price, nor because their
prices are lower than those prevailing in their home market, but because
dumping prices are presumptive evidence of abnormal and temporary cheapness.
Id. at 147. See also HABEm, supra note 1, at 314.
31 Temporary dumping may be differentiated as between that which is occasional or
"sporadic" and that which is systematic or "intermittent"; the former is the less important
but is nonetheless capable of bringing injury. See VINER 139-40, 146-47. Under the
American practice, antidumping proceedings may be dosed when the Secretary of the
Treasury is satisfied that the dumping sales have ceased. Note 91 infra. The paragraph
in the text is directed primarily to the consequences of intermittent dumping.
32 Short-run dumping, whatever its objective, may result in serious injury to
or even the total elimination of the domestic industry. The gain to the consumer
for a short period of abnormally low prices may not be nearly great enough to
offset the damage to the domestic industry, including the capital invested therein,
the labor which it employs, and the managerial ability which directs it.
VxiNz 140. See also H.Am=R, supra note 1, at 314; EJswoaTH, supra note 23, at 386.
1969]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
over to other lines, as they perhaps ought to do to adjust to a perma-
nent flow of competitive low-cost imports. An idling of the capital
and labor employed in such an industry comes at a particularly high
social cost. The unemployed capital and labor are wholly lost to the
economy for at least the short-run period during which they cannot
be shifted into any other line of production. And in the longer run
the idled factors should not be shifted into other lines, since (apart
from the dumping, which cannot be counted on) it is the pre-dumping
combination of capital and labor that makes the product available to
consumers at the lowest price. But if the dumping continues long
enough to necessitate a shift to other lines, the new uses of the capital
and labor will usually be less remunerative to the possessors of those
factors, and less valuable to the economy as a whole, than the old. Thus
temporary dumping not only idles production, but in addition it
tends to divert the factors of production to less economic employment.
Ultimately it may also cause prices to rise, either because the dumper
gains a monopoly or because the efficiency and ability to compete of
the domestic producers have been impaired. Even though the dumping
is temporary, then, it may bring enduring injury to the domestic
economy.83
B. Dumping as Reflecting a "Subsidy" Rather Than a Legitimate Ad-
vantage
The second ground for condemning dumping on comparative
advantage premises stems from the simple perception that a dumper
cannot afford to export his product at a cheap price unless he possesses
some sort of monopolistic control over his primary markets, sufficient
to enable him to charge higher prices there than he could exact under
competitive conditions. Thus, rather than exploiting a natural or
earned advantage, the dumper is availing himself of an anticompetitive
position that gives him the financial ability to maintain an artificially
lowered export price, inconsistently with the theory whereunder free
international competition maximizes international economic benefit.
The dumper is seen to be entering the American market with an unfair
"subsidy"; not even a liberal trade policy should allow the presumably
efficient domestic producers to suffer injury at the hands of such a com-
petitor.
How far can one say that the mere existence of differential prices
must reflect monopoly power in the primary market, the exploitation
of which enables the sale of exports at the lower price?
33 But cf. note 21 supra.
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Economists consider an enterprise to have monopoly power when-
ever it can set its prices at any level higher than the marginal cost of
production-that is, the incremental variable cost of making an ad-
ditional unit--quite irrespective of whether the firm is a "monopolist"
in the sense of being the only seller in its field. 4 Thus in economists'
terms dumping can never be profitably practiced unless the dumper
enjoys some degree of monopoly power in the higher-priced market;
otherwise, competition in that market would have forced the price
down to the level of marginal cost, and it would be unprofitable to
sell abroad at any price below that level3 5
But this does not establish that the monopoly power (which exists
in all cases of dumping except those in which the seller involuntarily
takes a loss, as when he gets rid of a surplus) is the causative factor that
enables the seller to export at the lower price. This issue must be sub-
jected to analysis in terms of three sets of variables: (1) whether the
export price exceeds the marginal cost of production (and, if so, whether
it exceeds the average total cost); (2) whether we are speaking of the
short run (during which fixed costs are constant) or the longer run
(during which the producer must renew and may enlarge his fixed-cost
investment, as for plant and equipment); and (3) whether the producer
experiences rising costs or declining costs per unit as his output is in-
creased.
The question in each case becomes one of the extent to which the
buyers in the home market, by paying a higher price, may bear a dis-
proportionate share of the costs that are attributable to the dumped
goods.36 We therefore focus on the way in which the seller recovers
the costs of that last increment of his total production that represents
the quantity dumped. Total costs always consist of fixed costs plus
variable costs. The seller's marginal cost of production is the incremen-
tal variable cost of producing an additional unit. Since we are treating
84 "Monopoly power," here, is equated with the status of a firm in an industry in
which "imperfect" rather than "perfect" competition exists, such that the producer can
have some control over the price at which he sells. See SAMUMSON 466-76, A more
pragmatic and realistic criterion of monopoly power over price might be the ability to
earn supernormal profits (i.e., to cover more than average costs, which include a
"normal profit") over an extended period of time. As suggested by the analysis that follows,
it is quite possible for a firm to dump profitably abroad while remaining subject to
"effective competition" that prevents it from earning supernormal profits at home.
35 "An approach to monopolistic control of the home market is perhaps the most
important prerequisite to the existence of dumping as a systematic and normal practise."
ViaNR 376. "[A] necessary condition [for successful dumping] is monopoly upon the
home market." HA,RtLE, supra note 1, at 301. "[Dumping] arises only because of the
monopolistic element in the home market." KmDWLBEGER, supra note 1, at 275.
86 See R.BMUXR 311-12.
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the dumped output as being the last increment of the seller's produc-
tion, we may for present purposes use the term "marginal cost" to refer
to the average variable cost of that entire increment, even though it
consists of more than one unit.
In the short run, during which fixed costs are constant, a sale will
be profitable whenever it exceeds the marginal cost (that is, the average
variable cost) of producing the increment of goods dumped; fixed costs
can be ignored entirely in deciding whether the home-market buyers
bear any disproportionate share of the costs of producing that part of
the seller's output. In the longer run, however, the seller must renew
his fixed investment, and so if his business is to be profitable he must
recover his total costs (variable plus fixed costs).
1. Sales Below Marginal Cost
Sale at a price below marginal cost always means an out-of-pocket
loss. The price does not even cover all of the variable cost of the product
sold, let alone any part of the fixed costs.
Dumping sales below marginal cost may be voluntarily undertaken
for predatory motives, or perhaps to preserve a customer relationship
during a period of fluctuating costs (which might or might not be pred-
atory). Of course a predatory dumper may ultimately succeed in recoup-
ing his losses from the export market, by later raising his price in that
market. Otherwise the seller must subsidize his dumping by making
primary-market sales at prices above marginal cost, 7 which he can do
only if he possesses monopoly power in that market. This conclusion
holds whether we speak of the short or the longer run, or of rising-
cost rather than declining-cost sellers.
38
Where the sale below marginal cost might be termed "involun-
tary"-as where the seller is trying to cut his loss on a surplus by ex-
porting it for whatever price it will fetch-it is harder to identify a
87 The "marginal cost" referred to here (above which the subsidizing home-market
sales must be priced) is the marginal cost of producing the goods sold on the home
market. Depending upon whether the cost pattern is a rising or a declining one, the
marginal cost of the home-sold product may be higher or lower than that of the incremen-
tal output dumped abroad. In the rising-cost pattern, the marginal cost of the product
sold at home will be lower than the marginal cost of the exported product; in these
circumstances it is possible to subsidize the exports without actually dumping, since the
profitable home price may be less than the unprofitable export price.
88 It is analytically possible to conceive circumstances in which a rising-cost seller
could reimburse his dumping losses through home sales at a price that exceeded the
average total cost but not the (higher) marginal cost at that level of production. Such a
pricing decision would result from a miscalculation as to how best to maximize profits
in the home market, rather than from an absence of monopoly power to set price above
marginal cost.
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subsidy. This is purely a short-run phenomenon. The seller does not
rely on his home-market buyers to reimburse any part of the costs not
covered by the export price. On the other hand, it cannot be said that
such a seller possesses a genuine economic advantage that confers bene-
fits upon the importing country through sporadic sales of this nature.
The antidumping law properly restricts such imports if they cause
injury.
2. Sales Above Marginal Cost-Short Run
Here there is no subsidy that enables the seller to export at the
dumping price. In the short run we are not concerned with the seller's
ability to stay in business or to maintain dumping over a substantial
period of time, but only with how he makes particular pricing decisions
during the span in which his fixed investment remains constant. Hence,
the producer's fixed costs can be completely ignored; he can profitably
sell additional output abroad for any price that covers the marginal
cost (i.e., the average variable cost) of that output. When he does so,
his only relevant costs are fully recovered from the export sale itself.
The dumping is in no way made possible by the higher home price,
since the home-market buyers bear no portion of the pertinent costs.
No subsidy exists, whether the seller experiences a rising or declining
cost pattern. Thus the dumper who undersells the American producers
in these circumstances is not ipso facto exploiting an artificial monopo-
listic advantage. Again, however, he has no authentic comparative ad-
vantage, since the short run is too brief a span in which to declare that
the existence of unsubsidized low-priced dumping sales establishes
the existence of such an advantage.
3. Sales Above Marginal Cost-Longer Run
Except in the case of exports that are directly subsidized by
bounty,39 dumping over a period longer than the short run can nor-
mally be maintained in appreciable quantities only by a seller whose
costs of production decline as output increases. He may be a producer
who in the absence of dumping has existing excess capacity that can be
renewed periodically at relatively low cost, or one who could realize
economies of scale by expanding capacity. For completeness, the cir-
cumstance of the rising-cost seller is briefly considered first.
a. Rising-Cost Sellers. When operating at or near full capacity,
a seller's average and marginal costs commonly rise as additional pro-
duction is undertaken. Although it is possible to envision a situation in
89 See HI x, supra note 1, at 301, 317-22; V1NE 126-30; notes 28, 16 supra.
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which the curve of marginal costs is rising but still lies below that of
average total costs, 40 the point is soon reached at which marginal cost
exceeds average cost for additional quantities of output. Beyond that
point, if the producer finds a market abroad at a price above his mar-
ginal cost, he is by hypothesis selling at a price above his average total
costs, and therefore is recovering from the export market all of the costs
(fixed and variable) attributable to the export sales. He does not rely on
home-market buyers to cover any share of those costs, and the latter
therefore do not subsidize the export. It is true that the seller's home-
market price, to invoke the antidumping laws, must stand even higher
above average total costs than the export price, so that the home sales
generate greater unit profits than do the export sales. The ability to
price at such a level in the home market undoubtedly bespeaks con-
siderable monopoly power, the exercise of which is yielding the seller
supernormal profits. 41 But his enhanced financial strength is not in any
way a factor that makes the dumping possible,42 since the dumping
price covers all the costs of the dumped goods. Such a seller has a
genuine cost advantage over producers in the export market whom he
can undersell at any price exceeding his marginal cost.
But it is unlikely that he could dump a great quantity in this
fashion. His rising marginal costs would quickly reach the level of the
export price (more precisely, the marginal revenue from the export
sales, a lower figure), beyond which the dumping would no longer be
profitable.4
3
b. Declining-Cost Sellers. For producers possessing existing ex-
cess capacity and those who can enjoy economies of scale by expanding
40 The curve of average costs would actually be falling in this situation. It is quite
unlikely that such a cost pattern could persist for an appreciable period, but if it did,
the dumping sales at a price above marginal cost but below average costs would
necessarily be subsidized by the home buyers' bearing a disproportionate share of the
fixed costs; the analysis is similar to that in the declining-cost pattern, discussed at
pp. 173-75 infra.
41 See note 34 supra.
42 That the dumper is gathering supernormal profits from home sales does not
itself create or reflect a subsidy, so long as the dumping sales are priced above marginal
costs (and therefore above average costs); it would, however, enhance the seller's ability
to penetrate the American market at predatory prices set below marginal costs or (what
can be economically much the same thing) to support expensive promotional campaigns
in that market.
If we add into the analysis the factor of possible fluctuation over time of the seller's
costs, however, we may recognize the possibility that the high home profits gathered
during the low-cost portion of the cycle might enable the dumper to maintain his low
dumping price during a part of the cycle when his average costs rose above that price;
then there would be a subsidy.
4a HAuERLER, supra note 1, at 309.
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capacity, the curve of marginal costs will stand below that of average
total costs, and both curves will fall as production is increased. For
these producers (just as for those with rising costs) to break even in
the long run, any sales priced below average costs must be compensated
for by other sales at prices above that level. But the nature of the
dedining-cost pattern is such that it encourages the producer to adopt
a policy of selling abroad at a price below his average costs.
The decreasing-cost producer can always sell abroad profitably
at any price exceeding the marginal cost of the incremental output,
even though that price is below average total cost. His ability to dump
permanently-i.e., in the economic long-run-depends solely on the
long-run profitability of his business in other markets (which here, for
simplicity, we will assimilate to the home market). If his home-market
business is profitable in the long run, which means that he is wholly
covering his fixed as well as his variable costs, he can dump indefinitely
at any price above marginal cost, even though that price makes no
contribution to the recovery of fixed costs that by definition is necessary
in the long run.44 If his home-market business is unprofitable, he can
still dump profitably at any price exceeding marginal cost, although of
course he cannot do so permanently if he cannot stay in business per-
manently.
Here we approach the central economic question of dumping. The
dumper, whose price may reflect only marginal costs, competes with
an American producer who will be injured unless he can recover his
total costs. 45 Which has the comparative advantage? Average total cost,
since it takes account of all long-run elements of cost and therefore
is consistent with permanency of price levels, is the familiar measure
44 It is possible to imagine one case of dumping that can persist economically in
the long run (i.e., indefinitely or permanently), even though total fixed costs are not
fully recovered from the home market. This would happen where home sales must
be priced just below the average total costs of the quantity produced for home sale, but
the dumping sales can be priced sufficiently above the marginal costs to make up the part
of fixed costs not covered by the home sales. Realistically, however, in declining-cost
industries, where competition characteristically induces price instability, such a delicate
balance is unlikely to continue for a substantial period of time.
45 For the present long-run analysis, we must presume that in the absence of dumping
the American producer is capable of staying in business indefinitely, and therefore is
covering his total costs, including fixed costs; his price must then approximate (or
exceed) his average total costs. It also seems necessary (though it may be unrealistic) to
assume a state of long-run competitive equilibrium among the American sellers, where-
under the individual firms cannot exact prices substantially above the level of their
average total costs. Of course, if the American producers experience declining costs in
the manufacture of the product, equilibrium among them is improbable, as is the ability
to sell above the level of average costs. See text accompanying note 49 infra.
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of economic advantage. But where the dumper is economically capable
of permanently maintaining exports on the basis of his marginal costs,
should not his advantage be measured by the dumping price, subsidy
or no subsidy? After a further examination of the economics of dump-
ing by declining-cost producers, I shall return to this question, and
explain my negative answer to it.
Normal profit-maximization strategies heighten the declining-cost
producer's incentive to engage in dumping, as a regular practice, when-
ever he is unable to increase his home sales but can find dependable
markets abroad. The critical factor is the producer's ability to lower
his average unit costs by expanding his volume of production.4 6 By
enlarging his production to the extent justified by potential sale of the
increment abroad, he reduces his average costs on the entire output,
including that sold in the home market. The savings thus realized make
the home sales more profitable. The increment is sold abroad at a price
which, while it must of course cover marginal costs, may be lower than
the average total costs at the increased level of production.47 Dumping
sales at such a price manifestly do not fully reimburse their pro rata
share of the fixed costs. But, at particular prices and quantities, the
amount by which the dumping sales fall short of covering average total
costs (including fixed costs) will be more than made up by the cost
savings on the portion of the output sold at home. Profitability is en-
hanced, then, not simply by selling abroad at a price above marginal
costs, but through a reduction of average costs that make home sales
more remunerative.
Conceivably the export price can be set below the home-market
price but still above the level of the seller's average total costs as reck-
oned on his expanded output. In this case there is dumping but no
subsidy, since all costs referable to the exported product are recovered
from the foreign sales. But export sales at any price below the level
of average total costs cannot exist, beyond the short run, without a
subsidy. As stated, such a price does not fully recompense the fixed costs
ratably attributable to the dumped goods; the home buyers, by paying
a higher price set by the exercise of at least some degree of monopoly
power in their market, inevitably bear a disproportionate share of the
fixed costs that must be recaptured over any period beyond the short
run. Thus the seller's market power at home generates the ability to
46 See ViNER 122-26; cf. HABERLER, supra note 1, at 302-13.
47 Obviously, as in all dumping cases, transportation costs or other factors must
segregate the two markets, so that the goods sold abroad may not practicably be reim-
ported and undercut the home market price. See HAraLaR 301.
[Vol. 54:159
ANTIDUMPING LAW & POLICY
sell abroad at a lower price, and can be viewed as subsidizing the dump-
ing.48 The subsidy makes it possible for the seller to enter the American
market more cheaply than would be economically possible at a uniform
price not differentiated between home and export sales.
Because competition among multiple sellers in declining-cost in-
dustries is characteristically unstable, it is frequently true that such
sellers cannot recover all of their costs in the home market.49 Falling
cost curves tempt firms into tactics of overproduction and repeated
price reduction, which press prices below average costs and down to-
ward the level of marginal costs. Such producers-who fit the classic
pattern of the "sick industry"--cannot regenerate their fixed costs and
therefore cannot stay in business over the long run. Through price-fixing
agreements and otherwise, however, they may attempt to continue
operation for an "intermediate run" so long as they can recoup variable
costs, in the hope also of defraying or renewing part of their fixed costs.
This situation, then, calls for recognition as one in which purely short-
run analysis will not serve. The incentive to dump will be governed by
the same considerations as control the seller who operates profitably
in the long run, and the same technique of profit-maximization (de-
scribed above) will apply. The fact that home-market sales are priced
below average cost, and consequently are unprofitable in any period
beyond the short run, affects only the potential duration of the dump-
ing, not its economic appeal to the seller. The home buyers, by the
subsidy of bearing a disproportionate share of the fixed costs that are in
fact recompensed, enable the seller for some period of time to sell to
the United States at the lower price. Thus the seller's transitory price
advantage in the American market should not be taken as evidence of
a true comparative advantage.
The ability of a declining-cost producer to price above average
costs is most likely to be found where the producer holds a literal mo-
nopoly in his home market. When one of the competitors experiences
a descending cost curve that prevails over the entire range of demand
in the relevant market, he can quickly become a true monopolist.50 By
continually lowering prices and expanding production to serve a larger
48 "[T]he entrepreneur covers his general overhead costs, or a more than propor-
tionate part of them, by home sales and... the high home price makes possible the cheap
foreign sales." Id. at 312. One might, however, employ a different analytical approach,
under which no subsidy to the export sales would be found. On this view, the dumping
sales contribute at least proportionately to the fixed costs (albeit indirectly) by making
possible the savings on production for home sale, enabling fixed costs to be recovered
more quickly in the home market.
49 See SA UEJLSON 446.
50 See id. at 460, 446.
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share of the market, he progressively lessens his unit costs. As his com-
petitors' share of the market contracts, their unit costs (based on reduced
output) must rise, rendering them increasingly unable to compete on
the basis of price. The single seller who survives such a course of events
will now possess full monopoly power to set price in his home market.
Unless restrained by government, he will of course set that price at a
profit-maximizing figure, which will in any case stand above the level
of average costs.
Where such a producer's cost structure continues to decline be-
yond the point at which domestic demand is fully satisfied, he is stimu-
lated to produce additional quantities for sale abroad. Since the home
market wholly requites the dumper's fixed costs, he can maintain
dumping profitably and permanently at any price that exceeds the mar-
ginal cost (average variable costs) of the incremental output.
Again, the foreign sales are subsidized by the exercise of monopoly
power that has regained the fixed costs from the home market. None-
theless this kind of dumping is capable of continuing permanently to
provide goods to the United States at a lower price than do the com-
peting domestic producers. The likelihood of such permanence would
be reinforced if the dumping seller enjoyed a "natural monopoly," with
the potential of selling at ever-decreasing prices, reflecting ever-decreas-
ing costs, through the whole of the foreseeable demand in the entire
world market. Does such a producer, despite the subsidy of his home-
market monopoly, display an advantage for which the Antidumping
Act should make an exception?
On balance, I believe the policy of the Act soundly applies to this
situation, on comparative advantage grounds as well as others. If there
are American producers who are selling the product at a price close
enough to the dumper's that they will be injured if no equalizing duty
is imposed but will be protected if the duty is applied, the American
consumer is probably not paying the American producer a great deal
more than he would pay the dumper in the absence of a dumping duty.
His detriment, even in the short run, is not likely to be great. On the
other hand, the consumer might be severely injured if the dumper,
after he had displaced the domestic producers in the American market,
abused his new-found monopoly by raising prices. One might in these
circumstances prefer a form of administrative price regulation, in the
public-utility style, to regulation by the antidumping laws.51 Administra-
51 Cf. Shipping Act of 1916, § 14b, as added by Shipping Act Amendments of 1961,
§ 1, 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1964), which permits carriers to offer lower rates to exclusive than
to non-exclusive shippers, on the condition that the lower rates "not be increased
before a reasonable period." Low-cost dumped goods, offering the prospect of permanent
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tive price surveillance might well be more supple, and afford finer
economic adjustments, than can the antidumping laws. But this sort
of regulation is difficult to enforce when the seller's physical capital is
not held "hostage" within American geographical jurisdiction. And it
could not insure against the possibility that the foreign supplier would
chafe under the regulation and withdraw his supply entirely, thereby
annihilating the promise of permanency upon which the differentiated
treatment of his imports must have been founded. Indeed, the economi-
cally-probable permanency might in particular circumstances lapse for
other reasons, including war, political dissension with the seller's
country, and like asymmetries.
Turning back in review of the other cost patterns that have been
examined, we encounter either a subsidy (sales below marginal cost),
or an insufficient period in which the cheap goods are likely to be
available (sales above marginal cost in the short run), or the improba-
bility that an appreciable quantity of the goods could be made con-
tinuously available (sales above marginal cost, and therefore above
average total cost, by a rising-cost seller). None of these exemplars,
consequently, reflects an authentic comparative advantage that under
free-trade premises would justify the toleration of injury to a presum-
ably efficient American industry. There remains the theoretically possi-
ble case of the declining-cost producer who can and will sell in the
United States, over the long run, at a dumping price that exceeds his
average total costs. Any such seller would possess a genuine economic
advantage in relation to the American producers he could undersell on
that basis, and on principle should be accorded the same treatment as
the producer of non-dumped merchandise. His case is probably not
a common one, however, since the declining-cost pattern encourages sale
abroad at prices below average costs. Even where such a seller exists, the
ever-present uncertainty about the continued availability of goods at a
low dumping price, compounded here by the question of whether the
price in fact exceeds average total costs, seems to warrant treating him
the same as other dumpers.
II
TiE NE W ANATOMY OF ANTIDUMPING PROCEEDINGS
Antidumping proceedings follow this sequence: 52 (1) Submission
of information of suspected dumping, by either a Customs official or
availability, might be permitted to enter the American market on a similar condition
that their prices not be increased or that they be kept within a regulated range.
52 For general treatment of the antidumping laws, see Conner & Buschlinger, The
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any private person; (2) investigation by Customs officials; (3) determina-
tion by the Treasury Department of whether there are sales in the
United States at less than fair value (that is, performing the price com-
parison to determine the existence of dumping sales at differentially
low prices); (4) issuance by the Commissioner of Customs of a notice
withholding appraisement of the merchandise; (5) determination by the
Tariff Commission of the existence or likelihood of injury to a domestic
industry; (6) formal publication of a "finding of dumping" by the Sec-
retary of the Treasury; and (7) imposition of the "special dumping
duty" upon shipments found to be dumped. The two most important
steps, corresponding to the two prime substantive elements of remedi-
able dumping, are the price comparison by the Treasury and the deter-
mination of injury by the Tariff Commission.
Particulars of these procedures have recently been modified by new
Treasury regulations,5 3 effective July 1, 1968, which were promulgated
in an effort to accomodate American antidumping practices to the pro-
visions of the International Antidumping Code. 4 That Code, signed
United States Antidumping Act: A Timely Survey, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 117 (1966); Coudert,
The Application of the United States Antidumping Law in the Light of a Liberal Trade
Policy, 65 COLUM. L. Rrv. 189 (1965); Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price
Discrimination: United States Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLux. L. R-v.
44 (1958); Feller, The Antidumping Act and the Future of East-West Trade, 66 MIcH.
L. Rxv. 115 (1967); Hendrick, The United States Antidumping Act, 58 Am. J. INT'L. L.
914 (1964); Kohn, The Antidumping Act: Its Administration and Place in American
Trade Policy, 60 Micis. L. Rnv. 407 (1962); Note, The Antidumping Act: Problems of
Administration and Proposals for Change, 17 STAN. L. REV. 730 (1965); Comment, The
Antidumping Act-Tariff or Antitrust Law?, 74 YAE L.J. 707 (1965).
A useful collection of recent materials is contained in SENATE COa-M. ON FINANCE,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON LEGISLATVE OVERSIGHT REVIEW Or US.
TRADE PoLIcIEs (2 vols. Comm. Print 1968), particularly at 73-203 [hereinafter cited as
COMPENDIUM]. The COMPENDIUM contains an excellent summary of the operation of the
Antidumping Act of 1921 by one closely associated with its administration, J. Hendrick,
Administration of the U.S. Antidumping Act-Procedures and Policies, id. at 156-87.
53 Antidumping Regulations, 33 Fed. Reg. 8244 (June 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited
as Regulations]. The Regulations will form a new Part 53 of the Customs Regulations,
19 C.F.R., replacing 19 C.F.R. §§ 14.6-14.13, 16.21, 16.22 and 17.9 (1967).
54 The text of the Code can be found in 32 Fed. Reg. 14,962 (1967) and in Com-
PENDIUM 129-36. The Code was the subject of a Hearing on International Antidumping
Code Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter cited as
International Antidumping Code Hearing], which contains the text of the Code at
263-74. The Code was signed by the United States, the European Economic Community,
and the following seventeen governments: Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. As of
June 27, 1968 all but Canada and Greece were prepared to implement the Code, effective
July 1, 1968. The Council of the European Economic Community adopted a conforming
antidumping regulation April 5, 1968. International Antidumping Code Hearing 19.
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at Geneva on June 30, 1967, as a result of the Kennedy Round of trade
negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in-
terprets and elaborates the GATT provision (article VI) concerned
with dumping.55 The stimulus for such a Code primarily came, on the
one hand, from the desire of the United States that her trading partners
adopt more open hearing procedures and (in some cases) more liberal
substantive standards in the administration of their antidumping laws,
and on the other hand from the wish of other countries to obtain a
liberalization of the American withholding of appraisement procedure
and of certain tests for determining injury that were felt to have pro-
tectionist effect.56
As an executive agreement entered into without prior congres-
sional mandate, the Code has no force of law in the United States that
would override federal statute or administrative action pursuant to
statute.5 7 Although the Code was negotiated with a close eye to Ameri-
55 Code preamble para. 4. Negotiations on the Code were part of the Kennedy
Round effort to reduce nontariff barriers. See Code preamble paras. 1-2; Rehm, The
Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 403, 427-31 (1968). For
analysis and discussion of the Code, see International Antidumping Code Hearing passim;
Executive Branch, Analysis of International Antidumping Code in Relation to Anti-
dumping Act, 1921, id. at 279-315; U.S. TARIFF COMm'N, REPORT TO SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE ON S. CON. REs. 88, REGARDING THE INTERNATIONAL ANTIDUMPING CODE SIGNED AT
GENEVA ON JUNE 30, 1967, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter cited as TAIFF
COMM'N REPORT ON THE CODE], reproduced in International Antidumping Code Hearing
319-88; American Mining Congress, Staff Study of International Dumping Code, in
COMPENDIUM 84-128; Comment, The Kennedy Round GATT Anti-Dumping Code, 29
U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 482 (1968).
58 The United States also sought to influence the shape of the pending European
Economic Community antidumping regulation, and to obtain Canada's commitment to
adopt an injury requirement in her antidumping law. For an Executive Branch statement
of the "legislative history" of the Code, see Rehm, supra note 55, at 427-31. See also
International Antidumping Code Hearing 11-14 (testimony of W. M. Roth and Matthew
Marks); Roth, What happened in the Kennedy Round, 57 DEP'T STATE BULL. 123, 126
(1967).
57 See International Antidumping Code Hearing 15-18 (testimony of W. M. Roth),
43-45 (committee questioning of J. B. Rehm); TARIFF COMM'N REPORT ON THE CODE
34-40 (views of Comm'r Clubb), 56-57 (views of Chairman Metzger and Comm'r Thun-
berg); REsTATEmENT (SECoND) OF Tim LAw oF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 144(1) (1965). See also United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953),
aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955); Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249, 292-93 (1967); Debate
between Senators Hartke and Javits, 113 CONG. RFEc. 12,106-09 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 1967).
It seems clear that the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 872 (1962), 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-1991 (1964), which conferred upon the executive branch the authority to negotiate
the Kennedy Round tariff reductions and related agreements, did not delegate negotiating
authority with respect to antidumping. "Other laws not intended to be affected include the
Antidumping Act of 1921 . S.." . REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1962). See also
International Antidumping Code Hearing, supra note 54, at 42-43, 44-45, 193-211; S. Con.
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can statutory requirements, 58 much of its draftsmanship is despairingly
intricate and obscure,59 and its provisions appear at certain points to
conflict with the Antidumping Act. In any event the instrument is not
self-executing, 60 but merely commits signatories to take all necessary
steps to conform their laws and procedures to its provisions.61 The
Executive Branch has taken the position that the necessary conformity
of American law can be entirely accomplished, without amendment of
the Antidumping Act, through revision of the Treasury regulations
and through the observance by the Tariff Commission of the Code's
standards of injury.692 The assertion that no conflict exists has been
vehemently disputed in the Congress.63 In September 1968 the Senate
attached to unrelated legislation a rider which would have directed the
Treasury and the Tariff Commission to continue to apply regulations
and interpretations as they existed before the effective date of the Code,
and to ignore the Code until such time as its provisions might be im-
Res. 100, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (passed by Senate but not by House), reproduced with
accompanying report, S. Rm'. No. 1341, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), in id. at 4-8.
58 The United States negotiators apparently intended no deviation from the Anti-
dumping Act of 1921. See Rehm, supra note 55, at 430; International Antidumping Code
Hearing 13-18 (testimony of W. M. Roth).
59 Savor, for instance, the prose of arts. 5(b) and 10(b) and the exceptions enumerated
in art. 11. The draftsmen might have done well to utilize the clarifying techniques
suggested in L. Allen, Symbolic Logic: A Razor Edged Tool for Drafting and Interpreting
Legal Documents, 66 YALE L.J. 838 (1957). The difficulties are those of syntactical
ambiguity rather than of conceptual vagueness. See R. Summers, A Note on Symbolic
Logic and the Law, 18 J. LEGAL E. 486, 490 (1961). Although some lawyers might view
this sort of lingo as "a sumptuous repast," E. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION 58 (1956), it
can look more like a "soybean cutlet." See J. Allen, Book Review, 9 STAN. L. REv. 219,
221 (1956). Parts of the new regulations are just as bad.
60 See RrSrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN REATIONS OF THE UNrrED
STATES §§ 144, 154 (1965).
61 Code art. 14. By art. 1, the signatories agree to take antidumping actions only in
accordance with the Code. The Tariff Commission has expressed the view that, as a
matter of international obligation, the United States is bound unconditionally by the
Code, whereas its former obligation under the antidumping provision of GATT (art. VI)
was limited by the saving clause of the Protocol of Provisional Application of the GATT,
61 Stat, pt. 6, at A2,051 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 808 (1950). Under that
clause signatories were obliged to observe GATT requirements only to the extent they
were not inconsistent with legislation (such as the Antidumping Act of 1921) existing
as of October 80, 1947. TAIFF COMM'N REPORT ON THE CODE, supra note 55, at 7-9.
62 See Executive Branch statement on dumping, in COWENDIUM 78; International
Antidumping Code Hearing, supra note 54, at 16 (testimony of W. M. Roth).
63 See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 38, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), introduced by Senators
Hartke and Scott, which would declare that the Code conflicts with the Act, and should
become effective only when implemented by legislation; Letter of Senator Hartke to
other senators, July 25, 1967, reproduced in CoMPENDrU 153; International Antidumping
Code Hearing 20-62, 81-84 (comments of Senators R. Long and V. Hartke).
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plemented by legislation.6 4 These strictures, however, were largely
moderated by the House-Senate conference,65 with the apparent result
that the administering authorities, acting within their existing discre-
tion, may implement the Code to the extent it does not conflict with
the Act. 6
64 The provisions were added by the Senate to H. R. 17324, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968), a bill to amend the Renegotiation Act of 1951, by adding title II thereto. The
amendments also contained specific limitations upon the power of the Secretary of the
Treasury to terminate proceedings. The Senate's action followed an earlier attempt in
the same Congress to nullify the Code. S. Con. Res. 38, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967),
reproduced in International Antidumping Code Hearing 9.
Since the last amendments to the Antidumping Act in 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-630, 72
Stat. 583, numerous amendments have been proposed that would have rendered the Act
more restrictive. E.g., S. 3606, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (introduced by Sen. Humphrey);
S. 1318, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963) (introduced by Sen. Humphrey); S. 2241, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963) (introduced by Sen. Allott); H.R. 10832, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (in-
troduced by Rep. Herlong); H.R. 979, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (introduced by Rep.
Conte); S. 2045, 89th Cong., 1st Ses. (1965) (introduced by Sen. Hartke) and H.R. 8510,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (introduced by Rep. Herlong); S. 1726, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967) (introduced by Sen. Hartke). A comparison of S. 1726 against existing law and
the Code is offered in the American Mining Congress's staff study, reproduced in Com-
P'NNwua 83-126.
In a broader setting, the controversy over the antidumping laws might be viewed as
a persistent strain in a continuing struggle between the free-traders of the Executive
Branch and the protectionists of Congress for supremacy in determining United States
trade policy. Such a tension is amusingly reflected in the exchanges between Senators and
Executive Branch witnesses in the June 1968 International Antidumping Code Hearing
30-38, 11-47 passim. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1366 (1964), Editorial, N. Y. Times, Sept. 80,
1968, at 46, col. 2 (city ed.).
65 The agreed conference version of the amendments can be found at 114 CoNG. REC.
S 12,168 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1968) and at 114 CoNG. REc. H 9506 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1968).
In addition to declaring that nothing in the Code "shall be construed to restrict the
discretion of" the Tariff Commission in antidumping cases, the key provisions state that
the Commission and the Secretary of the Treasury shall:
(1) resolve any conflict between the International Antidumping Code and
the Antidumping Act, 1921, in favor of the Act as applied by the Agency admin-
istering the Act, and
(2) take into account the provisions of the International Antidumping Code
only insofar as they are consistent with the Antidumping Act, 1921, as applied
by the agency administering the Act.
Id. The provisions of the Senate version, requiring adherence to prior regulations
and precedents, and requiring the Code to be disregarded until implemented by legis-
lation, were deleted. The conference wording that refers to the Act "as applied by the
agency administering the Act," however, leaves ambiguity as to whether the Tariff
Commission might permissibly exercise its "discretion" by narrowing its past concepts of
injury to bring them more into line with the Code. See colloquy between Senators Russell
Long and Javits, 114 CONG. REC. S 12,163-69 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1968).
66 Although the Treasury has issued new regulations to accomplish conformity to
the Code in matters within its authority (as discussed below), it is problematical whether
the Tariff Commission will proceed to implement the Code's standards of injury. In its
report of March 13, 1968 to ihe Senate Committee on Finance, a majority of the Com-
mission (Comm'rs Sutton, Culliton and Clubb) identified important differences between
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One principal point of controversy concerns the possible inconsis-
tency of the Code's requirements with the plan of the Antidumping
Act whereunder the price comparison determination is made by the
Secretary of the Treasury and the injury determination is made "there-
after" by the Tariff Commission.67 The Code, through an intricate
interplay of articles 5(b) and 10(a), appears to require simultaneous
consideration of injury along with the price comparison question
during the earlier stages of the proceedings conducted by the Trea-
sury. By an ingenious and subtle revision of the former procedures,
the new Treasury regulations have attempted to reconcile the Code
with the Act.
A. Initiation of Proceedings
Any district Customs officer or any person outside the Customs
Service who has information of "suspected dumping" may commence
an antidumping proceeding by communicating that information to the
Commissioner of Customs (a Treasury Department official). 8 The com-
munication should, to the extent feasible, identify the product, the
exporter,6 9 the producer, and the exporting country.70 In addition it
the Code standards of injury on the -one hand and the Act and Tariff Commission
injury doctrines on the other, and held in effect that, in the absence of implementing
legislation, the Code should be given little if any weight. TAsun' COMM'N REPORT ON
THE CODE, supra note 55, at 10-22, 24-25, 29-80, 32-33; id. at 35, 39-41, 47 (additional
comments of Comm'r Clubb). The minority (Chairman Metzger and Comm'r Thunberg)
believed that, as particular cases arise for decision, it may be possible to construe the
Code and the Act together in a way that avoids conflict. Id. at 55-56. The majority may
be shifted by the accession of new members to the Commission. Since the retirement of
Comm'r Culliton on June 16, 1968, there have been two vacancies. On April 2, 1968
President Johnson nominated for the earlier vacancy Mr. Bernard Norwood (who has
been associated with the office of the President's Special Trade Representative), but on
October 8, 1968 withdrew Mr. Norwood's name and nominated Mr. Will E. Leonard, Jr.
and Mr. Herschel D. Newsom. N. Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1968, at 26, col. 1 (city ed.).
67 Act § 201(a), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964). This division of labor was instituted with
amendments to the Act in 1954. Customs Simplification Act of 1954, ch. 213, tit. III, 68
Stat. 1138 (1954).
68 Regulations §§ 53.2, 53.26.
69 The Antidumping Act makes no provision for aggregating complaints, i.e., filing
several complaints at once against several foreign exporters and producers. It is possible
that no single exporter is causing significant harm but that together the exporters are
injuring domestic industry. The prior regulations allowed the Secretary of the Treasury
to delay his determination while another cause was pending, and thus sometimes to secure
a procedure akin to aggregating complaints. 19 C.F.R. § 14.8(a) (1967). See Hendrick, in
COMPENDium 167-68; Note, supra note 52, at 734-36. The new regulations make no
such provision, but they appear to allow a single complaint against several producers
and exporters from one country. Regulations §§ 53.27(b),(c).
70 Regulations §§ 53.27(a)-(c). Complaints also should name the ports of importation
into the United States, id. § 53.27(d), and recommend possible avenues of further investi-
gation. Id. § 53.27(i).
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should supply any available information about prices and sales of the
product either in the exporting country or for exportation to third
countries. 71 To fulfill the administrative provisions of the International
Code,72 the regulations also specify that evidence of injury should ac-
company the initial communication. 73 If the information submitted
conforms substantially to all these requirements, 7 4 the Commissioner
of Customs conducts a summary investigation. 5 If he determines that
the submitted information is patently in error or that the merchandise
is not being or is not likely to be imported in more than insignificant
quantities, he will close the case.7 6 Otherwise, he will publish in the
Federal Register an "Antidumping Proceeding Notice," summarizing
the information submitted, specifying the shipments affected, and in-
dicating the date upon which the information of suspected dumping
was received in acceptable form.77 The Commissioner thereupon under-
takes a "full scale investigation" to prepare information for the use of
the Secretary of the Treasury in determining the price comparison
question.78 The entire case then goes to the Secretary for determination
of the price comparison issue.7 9
B. The Price Comparison to Determine Whether There are "Dump-
ing Sales"
What is commonly thought of as "dumping"-sale at a differen-
tially low price-takes place under the terminology of the Antidumping
Act when the merchandise is sold "at less than its fair value."80 (Under
the scheme of the Act, the term "dumping" strictly should not be used
unless injury has also been found.)81 For simplicity of reference, I will
71 Id. §§ 53.27(f)-(h).
72 Code arts. 5(b), 10(a). See note 127 infra.
73 Regulations § 53.27(e).
74 If it does not, the Commissioner will return it to the person who submitted it,
with advice concerning its deficiencies. Id. § 53.28.
75 Id. § 53.29.
76 Id.
77 Id. § 53.30. The date has significance for retroactive application of withholding of
appraisement and of the antidunping duty. See notes 126, 158 infra.
78 Regulations §§ 53.31, 53.32(a).
79 The new regulations explicitly empower Customs representatives to conduct inves-
tigations in any other country that does not object. Regulations § 53.31(a). Article 6(e) of
the Code sanctions this practice provided the host government is notified and does not
object, and provided that the agreement of "the firms concerned" is obtained.
80 Act § 201(a), 42 Stat. 11 (1921), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
81 In contrast, art. VI of GATT defines "dumping" as simply the act "by which
products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less
than the normal value of the products." 62 Stat. 3682 (1948). Article 2(a) of the Code uses




use the term "dumping sales" in place of the clumsy locution "sales at
less than fair value."
The Secretary of the Treasury compares the price to the United
States importer ("purchase price") with the "fair value" of the mer-
chandise.8 2 (1) In the usual case the fair value is measured by the price
at which such or similar merchandise is sold for consumption in the
country of exportation. (I shall refer to this measure as the "home-
market price" test of fair value.)83 (2) If the quantity of home-market
sales is small in relation to the quantity sold by the exporting country
to countries other than the United States, then the price for export to
such countries is taken as the measure of fair value (the "export price"
test)8 4 (3) If the available information concerning home-market price
and export price is deemed insufficient, a theoretical fair value will be
"constructed" on the basis of cost and expense figures and an allowance
for profit (the "constructed value" test).88 (4) Whenever the merchan-
82 Regulations §§ 53.3(a), 53.4(a). Section 203 of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 162 (1964), defines
"purchase price" and specifies the adjustments to be made for factors not reflected in the
actual price. Where the exporter and importer are related, see id.) §§ 207, 208, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 166, 167 (1964), the comparison will be made on the basis of the "exporter's sales price,"
defined in id. § 204, 19 U.S.C. § 163 (1964), instead of the purchase price. The exporter's
sales price is used when merchandise is imported on consignment. Use of the exporter's
sales price is sanctioned by art. 2(e) of the Code. For an interesting comparison of
"purchase price" and "exporter's sales price," see Rayon Staple Fiber from France, 24
Fed. Reg. 10,092 (1959).
83 Regulations § 53.3. This provision incorporates the first of the two standards of
"foreign market value" established by § 205 of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 164 (1964), for other
purposes (i.e., concerning the initiation of withholding of appraisement, Act § 201(b),
19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964), and concerning imposition of the special antidumping duty, Act
§ 202(a), 19 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1964)).
Offers will be considered evidence of fair value if there were no sales, Regulations
§ 53.10, but no pretended offer or sale will be considered. Id. § 53.12. If sales were made
at varying prices, the price at which the preponderance of goods were sold will be used;
if there is no such preponderance, a weighted average of the prices will be used. Id. § 53.13.
84 Regulations § 53.4. This provision incorporates the second of the two standards
of "foreign market value" established by § 205 of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 164 (1964); see note
83 supra. Generally, if the quantity sold in the home market is less than 25% of the
quantity exported to countries other than the United States, the export price test will be
used. Regulations § 53.4(b); see H-endrick, in COMPENDIum 161-62; 19 C.F.R, § 14.7(a) n.15,
example 2 (1967).
85 Regulations § 53.5. This provision incorporates the definition of "constructed value"
established by § 206 of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 165 (1964). Section 206 defines constructed value
as the cost of materials and of fabrication, plus at least 10% of these costs as an allowance
for overhead ("general expenses'), plus at least 8% of all these as an allowance for profit.
The Secretary of the Treasury has stated that, because of variation in accounting
methods among countries, the constructed value test of fair value is "warranted only
as a last resort." Hearings on Amendments to the Antidumping Act of 1921 Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 n.1 (1957).
Use of the export price and constructed value tests is sanctioned by art. 2(d) of the
Code.
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dise comes from a country that has a state-controlled economy, the Trea-
sury applies a special constructed value, which is determined (in the
language of the regulations) on the basis of "normal costs, expenses, and
profits as reflected by the prices at which such or similar merchandise
is sold," either domestically or for export, by producers in "a non-state-
controlled-economy country."86 (I shall call this the "third-country
price" test.)
To make the price comparison equitable, adjustments will be
made for factors that affect the differential between fair value and pur-
chase price. Thus, quantity discounts actually granted to the American
importer will be considered,8 7 as will "bona fide differences in circum-
stances of sale" such as differences in terms of credit, guarantees, ser-
vicing warranties, technical assistance, and assumption of advertising
costs."" Similarly, differences in the merchandise and in the cost of
manufacture may be taken into account8 9
From the information before him (both that adduced by the
Customs investigation and that submitted by interested persons), the
Secretary determines whether there are dumping sales. 90 A negative
determination91 must first be published on a tentative basis, and an
86 Regulations § 53.5(b). See, e.g., Fur Felt Hat Bodies from Czechoslovakia, 81 Fed.
Reg. 15,024 (1966); Shoes from Rumania, 31 Fed. Reg. 14,361 (1966). This third-country
price test is appraised at length in part III, below.
87 Regulations § 53.7. See Hendrick, in Coams Ium 162-63.
88 Regulations § 53.8. See Hendrick, in ComPENDwm 163-64.
89 Regulations § 53.9. See Hendrick, in COMPENDIUM 164-65. See also the definition of
"similar merchandise" in § 212(3) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 170a(3) (1964).
90 Regulations §§ 53.32, 53.33, 53.35, 53.37. During all proceedings, both before the
Treasury and before the Tariff Commission, interested persons may make written sub-
missions and may request oral hearings. Id. §§ 53.32(b), 53.33(b), 53.37 (Treasury); 19
C.F.R. §§ 208.4, 208.5 (1967) (Tariff Comm'n). (On the timing of Treasury proceedings, see
note 120 infra.) Generally, information submitted will be available for examination by
any person. Regulations § 53.23 (Treasury); 19 C.F.R. § 201.5 (1967) (Tariff Comm'n); see
Administrative Procedure Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (1967). Parties may, however, request
confidential treatment of submitted information, which will ordinarily be granted if the
information concerns business or trade secrets, production or distribution costs, or details
of particular sales. Regulations §§ 53.23(b)-(c) (Treasury); 19 C.F.R. §§ 201.5(a), 201.6
(1967) (Tariff Comm'n); see Administrative Procedure Act § 3(b)(4), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(4)
(1967).
91 Regulations § 53.33. If the quantity involved or the difference between purchase
price and fair value is not "more than insignificant," a negative determination will be
made. Id. § 53.14; Hendrick, in CoMFENDIUm 166, 179-80 n. 68. The Secretary may terminate
the proceedings at any time during the investigation when satisfied that the dumping sales
have ceased, or that the price of the goods has been revised to eliminate the dumping
margin, or that other controlling circumstances have changed. Regulations § 53.15. See
generally Hendrick, in COMPENDiUm 166-67. The Secretary will not discontinue proceedings,
despite assurances from the exporters or importers that sales will no longer be made, if
he believes "hit and run" dumping to be involved. Titanium Dioxide from Japan, 31
Fed. Reg. 3198 (1966). Cf. Chromic Acid from Australia, 29 Fed. Reg. 2919 (1964).
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opportunity is afforded to interested persons to present additional in-
formation and argument before a final determination is made.92 When
the Secretary's determination is affirmative, it is published on a defini-
tive basis,93 allowing the Commissioner of Customs forthwith to order
withholding of appraisement,94 and allowing the case to be referred
immediately to the Tariff Commission for its determination of the
injury question.9 5 Such an affirmative determination of the price com-
parison issue, however, retains a tentative quality about it.
C. Withholding of Appraisement
Duties ordinarily are not reassessed after the processes of appraise-
ment and final liquidation of duties have been completed.96 If dumped
goods could continue to receive routine appraisement during the
pendency of antidumping proceedings, then, they would entirely
escape any dumping duty ultimately determined to be appropriate. The
dumper would be encouraged to increase his dumping during that
period, thereby intensifying the injury to American industry that the
antidumping law is designed to prevent. Hence the law supplies the
interim protective device of suspending or "withholding" appraise-
ment of the goods, which postpones the final determination of duties
until completion of the antidumping proceedings. 97 During the pen-
92 Regulations § 53.33.
93 Id. §§ 53.35, 53.36. The former regulations called for a "tentative determination"
where the finding was affirmative as well as where it was negative; notice of the tentative
determination invited interested persons to submit written materials and to request an
opportunity to be heard. 19 C.F.R. § 14.8(a) (1967). Such notice is now given, in advance
of final determination, only when it appears to the Secretary that his determination will
be negative. Regulations §§ 53.33(a)-(b).
94 The "withholding of appraisement notice will be issued concurrently with the
Secretary's determination pursuant to § 53.35 .... R egulations § 53.34(a).
95 Id. § 53.38. See note 119 infra.
98 See Hendrick, in COMPENDIUM 159-60.
97 The basic statutory provision is § 201(b) of the Act:
Whenever, in the case of any imported merchandise of a class or kind as
to which the Secretary has not so made public a finding, the Secretary has reason
to believe or suspect, from the invoice or other papers or from information
presented to him or to any person to whom authority under this section
has been delegated, that the purchase price is less, or that the exporter's sales
price is less or likely to be less, than the foreign market value (or, in the absence
of such value, than the constructed value), he shall forthwith publish notice of
that fact in the Federal Register and shall authorize, under such regulations as he
may prescribe, the withholding of appraisement reports as to such merchandise
entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption, not more than one
hundred and twenty days before the question of dumping has been raised by or
presented to him or any person to whom authority under this section has been
delegated, until the further order of the Secretary, or until the Secretary has
made public a finding as provided for in subdivision (a) in regard to such
merchandise.
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dency of withholding, the merchandise may nevertheless be appraised
in the usual manner if Customs officials are satisfied that the particular
shipment is not being dumped;98 otherwise, the importer can obtain
immediate entry of the goods only by posting a bond to cover possible
dumping duties.99
Withholding of appraisement is initiated by publication of an
appropriate notice under the authority of the Commissioner of Cus-
toms100 whenever there is "reason to believe or suspect" the existence
of dumping sales.101 Until 1968, this question was decided and the
notice of withholding was published on the basis of preliminary inves-
tigations by the Commissioner, conducted before the stage at which a
definitive determination concerning dumping sales might be made by
the Secretary.102 Because the case awaited decisions both by the Secre-
tary and then by the Tariff Commission, appraisement might be with-
held for a considerable period of time, which in the recent past averaged
about a year.10 3 During the period of withholding, of course, importa-
tion of the allegedly dumped goods would be inhibited, since the im-
porter would not know what duties he might ultimately have to pay.
Moreover, withholding was imposed solely on a preliminary considera-
tion of the price comparison question, without affording the importer
opportunity to present information or defenses touching the question
of injury.10 4 For these reasons, the former procedure was fairly subject
68 Stat. 1139 (1954), 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964), as amended by 72 Stat. 583 (1958).
Withholding of appraisement is sanctioned as an "appropriate provisional measure"
by art. 10(b) of the Code, subject to certain conditions. Other approved provisional
measures used by other nations are provisional duties (which may be refunded in whole
or in part at the close of the proceeding) and the requirement of a deposit or bond
equal to the amount of the antidumping duty provisionally estimated. Code art. 10(b);
see Hendrick, in COMPENDIUM 177 n.24.
98 Regulations § 53.48(b).
99 Id. §§ 53.53, 53.54; Act § 208, 19 U.S.C. § 167 (1964).
10D Regulations § 53.34. The Act § 201(b), 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964), calls for the notice
to be published by the Secretary, but his authority has been delegated to the Commissioner
of Customs. T. D. 53,654, 89 TRnAs. DEC. 334 (1954). Upon publication of the notice,
district customs officials withhold appraisement and release of the subject merchandise.
Regulations §§ 53A8, 53.53.
101 Act § 201(b), 68 Stat. 1139 (1954), 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964), set out in note 97 supra.
102 19 C.F.R. §§ 14.6(e), 14.8(a) (1967). As a matter of practice, withholding was not
usually authorized until the Treasury had made a tentative determination of dumping
sales. TARIF COMM'N REPORT ON THE CODE, supra note 55, at 31.
103 TARIu COmM'N REPORT ON THE CODE 30-31. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 52, at 60-61,
for earlier examples of long delay.
104 The prior regulations, 19 C.F.R. § 14.6(b)(3) (1967), requested the complainant
to submit available information as to the total value and volume of domestic production
of the merchandise in question. But they contained no provision that such information-
or any other matter pertinent to the question of injury-be evaluated or considered in
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to the criticism that it had a. protectionist effect-deterring for long
periods the importation of goods upon which it might ultimately be
found that no dumping duties should be imposed.105
The new GATT Code substantially restricts such use of the with-
holding of appraisement device. Provisional measures like withholding
are limited to a three-months' duration,106 and they may not be imposed
unless there is "sufficient evidence of injury."'07 The authors of the 1968
Treasury regulations have responded to these requirements with a
dazzling tour de force of draftsmanship, the results of which become
almost blindingly complex when viewed in the light of the statute and
the practical considerations reflected in the prior practice.
To take the simplest point first, the new regulations allow the
Commissioner to order withholding of appraisement only "if there is
evidence on record concerning injury."'' 08 Of course, the only evidence
of injury that the Commissioner (or any other official) has at this point
is what the complainant submitted as part of his original information.109
Whether the mere existence of such ex parte "evidence on record" ful-
fills the Code requirement of "sufficient evidence" is questionable.110 In
any case, the regulations make no explicit provisions for evaluating
that information before issuance of the withholding notice;"' to do
the Treasury Department phase of the antidumping proceeding. See Prosterman, With-
holding of Appraisement Under the United States Anti-Dumping Act: Protectionism or
Unfair-Competition Law?, 41 WAsH. L. REv. 315, 321-25 (1966) (suggesting amendment
of the Act to require some showing of injury before withholding of appraisement could
be ordered). See text at note 111 infra.
105 On the inhibitory effects of the delay and uncertainty wrought by the with-
holding of appraisement, see Prosterman, supra note 104; Coudert, supra note 52, at
198-200; Rehm, supra note 55, at 429; Ehrenhaft, supra note 52, at 60-61. But see Conner
& Buschlinger, supra note 52, at 129-31.
106 Code art. 10(d). An exception, allowing withholding to continue up to six months
on request of the exporter and the importer, is reflected in Regulations § 53.34(b).
107 Code art. 10(a). Article 5(b) of the Code requires that evidence of both dumping
sales and injury be considered simultaneously "in the decision whether or not to initiate
an investigation." The intention, obviously, is to free from the burdens of an antidumping
proceeding (and of provisional measures) goods which clearly can be shown not to be
causing injury (for example, because their price merely meets competition in the domestic
market). See Prosterman, supra note 104, at 320-23.
108 Regulations § 53.34(a).
109 See note 73 supra. It is unclear how much evidence must accompany the com-
plaint; the requirement probably is not stringent. See remarks of Senator Javits, 113
CONG. REc. 12,107 (daily ed. Aug. 23, 1967).
110 Article 5(c) of the Code would require that the complaint be rejected and the
investigation terminated if there is not sufficient evidence of injury "to justify proceeding
with the case." See also note 107 supra.
Ill Since the new regulations have come into force, the Commissioner of Customs,
in antidumping proceeding notices, see note 77 supra, has explicitly declared that there
"is evidence on record concerning injury to or likelihood of injury to or prevention of
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so might trench upon the statutory power of the Tariff Commission.112
The regulations, faithfully to the Code, limit the period of with-
holding to three months."13 But how, one may ask, can there be enough
time for the Secretary to conclude his price comparison determination
and then for the Tariff Commission "thereafter" to conclude its injury
determination, especially when it is remembered that the statute assures
the Commission three months in which to act?" 4 Obviously, the period
of withholding cannot be allowed to expire before the case is concluded
by Tariff Commission action, for otherwise the importer would be
entitled to have the goods appraised and introduced into internal com-
merce before a dumping duty could be assessed." 5 The regulations
answer by providing that the withholding notice be published concur-
rentZy with the Secretary's affirmative determination of the existence
of dumping sales."16 Since it is further provided that the case shall be
referred to the Tariff Commission upon the making of such affirmative
determination,11 7 the three-month withholding period coincides with
the three months within which the Tariff Commission may consider
the injury question.
But this arrangement raises difficulties at the other end of the
proceeding-with respect to dumped goods coming in before the date
on which withholding of appraisement can now be ordered. First, is
establishment of an industry in the United States." E.g., Transformers from Japan, 33 Fed.
Reg. 12,920 (1968); Plastic Mattress Handles from Canada, 33 Fed. Reg. 12,792 (1968);
Loudspeakers from Japan, 33 Fed. Reg. 12,792 (1968). See Regulations § 53-30(c). Nothing
in the provisions stating the nature of investigations by the Commissioner or the Secre-
tary, id. §§ 53.29, 53.31, 53.32, expresses any authority or procedure to develop informa-
tion about injury, to receive rebuttal evidence from the importer, or in any way to
appraise such information about injury as has been supplied by the complainant. If pro-
ceedings were to be dismissed on grounds of insufficient injury evidence, this would have
to be done under general powers to discontinue proceedings, see id. §§ 53.15(a), 53.31(b),
since no specific power to do so is expressed.
112 See TARIFF Coa m'N REPORT ON THE CODE, supra note 55, at ,5 (majority view).
The minority understands the Treasury's role only to be that of "assuring itself that
initiation of the investigation would not be futile, in the sense that it would be a waste
of taxpayers' money for the Government to initiate a full anti-dumping investigation,"
and on that assumption believes there will be no interference with Tariff Commission
functions. Id. at 59.
313 Regulations § 53.34(a). The voluntary six-month period, note 106 supra, will not
be further considered.
114 Act § 201(a), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
115 The goods would not be caught by the provision for retroactive application of
the dumping duty, since the duty is applied only to goods that have not been appraised
prior to publication of the "dumping finding" that concludes the litigation and imposes
the duty. Regulations § 5356(a),
116 Id. § 53.34(a).
117 Id. § 53,38.
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the new scheme consistent with the apparently mandatory statutory re-
quirement that withholding "shall" be ordered as soon as there is
"reason to believe or suspect" that dumping sales exist, rather than at
the logically later time of definitive determination of the question by
the Secretary?"" Both conceptually and practically, under what one
might take to be the clear purport of the Act, the initiation of with-
holding must come before the definitive determination itself. Withhold-
ing is, after all, a provisional remedy intended to protect against dump-
ing during the very pendency of definitive proceedings. Moreover,
it rests on a lesser quantum of proof, such as is available at an earlier
stage. The statutory legitimacy (if not the ingenuity) of the new con-
current-action technique may be gravely questioned.
A second and quite practical question is whether the new arrange-
ment means that no action can be taken to stem the dumping until
the conclusion of all the investigations and hearings leading to the
Secretary's determination (a process that under prior practice ordinarily
took several months). Here again the draftsmen of the regulations have
been ingenious, if not ingenuous. The essence of their solution is that
the Secretary's affirmative determination will be definitive in form
(allowing immediate commencement of withholding and reference to
the Tariff Commission)" 9 but tentative in substantive effect. The regu-
lations seem clearly to contemplate (although they do not straightfor-
wardly provide) that much of the actual litigation and evaluation of
the question of dumping sales can take place after the supposedly
118 See the structure of § 201(b) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964), set forth in
full in note 97 supra. The new regulations pay lip service to the statute by conditioning
withholding upon the Commissioner's having "reasonable grounds to believe or suspect"
the existence of dumping sales, Regulations § 53.34(a), but the same section further con-
ditions commencement of withholding upon the Secretary's affirmative determination.
Despite the statutory language that the Secretary "forthwith ... shall authorize ... with-
holding" upon having reasonable grounds to suspect dumping sales, it might be argued
that the words "under such regulations as he may prescribe" grant the Secretary dis-
cretion to commence withholding at a later time. Cf. Act § 407, 42 Stat. 18 (1921), 19
U.S.C. § 173 (1964): "That the Secretary shall make rules and regulations necessary for
the enforcement of this Act." It seems doubtful that the quoted authority is a delegation
of legislative rather than procedural rule-making powers. See Kreutz v. Durning, 69 F.2d
802 (2d Cir. 1934), inconclusive on a related point.
119 Under the statutory scheme, it would not seem permissible to refer the case to
the Tariff Commission until the Secretary has made a definitive determination on the
question of dumping sales. "Whenever the Secretary . . . determines that [there is the
likelihood or actuality of dumping sales] .... he shall so advise the United States
Tariff Commission .... " Act § 201(a), 68 Stat. 1138 (1954), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964). See
TAIRF Comm'N REPORT ON THE CODE, supra note 55, at 22-23. The previous regulations
permitted reference to the Tariff Commission upon the making of a "determination,"
which, it is clear from the context, meant only the "final determination" and not the
"tentative determination" earlier described in the same provision. 19 C.F.R. § 14.8(a) (1967).
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definitive determination, which can be revoked or modified during the
three-month period for withholding and for Tariff Commission consid-
eration of the injury issue.120 The purpose evidently is three-fold: to
120 Regulations §§ 53.37, 58.39, 53.83(d). Concededly, these artfully-worded provisions
do not plainly disclose the intention I have asserted in the text. When the current regula-
tions were in proposed form, the intention was clearer. Section 53.38 of the proposed
regulations authorized any person believing the Secretary's determination to be in error
to request an opportunity to present evidence and argument, whereafter under § 53.39 the
determination might be modified or revoked. 32 Fed. Reg. 14,959-60 (1967). This is much
the same sort of process that took place between the tentative and final determinations
under the prior practice. 19 C.F.R. § 14.8(a) (1967). Under the final regulations now in
force, the pertinent provision, § 53.37, retains the caption, "Affirmative determination-
opportunity to present views," but has changed the test to authorize further proceedings
at the request of any person believing the withholding action to be in error. In substance,
however, it is the determination itself that is reopened, not merely the withholding
action. Sections 53.39 and 53.33(d) continue to provide, as they did in the proposed regu-
lations, for revocation or modification of the determination "if the Secretary is persuaded
from information submitted or arguments received that his determination ... was in
error." In fact, nothing is said about revoking or modifying the withholding action, despite
the revised wording of § 53.87 (corresponding to § 58.38 of the proposed regulations).
It is true that there is an opportunity for "submission of views" before the determina-
tion is made. Regulations § 53.32(b). But the construction presented in the text, allowing
substantial litigation after that determination, is the only one that fulfills the purposes of
prompt withholding and of simultaneity of consideration of dumping sales and injury. As
explained by counsel who participated in negotiation of the Code, "[W]hile the Tariff
Commission is conducting its investigation the Department of the Treasury will review its
determination of dumping." Rehm, supra note 55, at 433. Any other interpretation would
defeat this objective of simultaneity. The Code's three-month limit on withholding sup-
plies another reason not to use a "tentative" determination first (as continues to be done
with negative determinations, Regulations § 53.83(a)). A tentative determination so labelled
would under Code art. 10(a) permit withholding to begin, but would not allow immediate
reference to the Tariff Commission, see note 119 supra, and thus the three-month with-
holding period would expire before the Commission had its statutory three months in
which to consider injury. Hence the first affirmative determination must be treated as a
definitive one, in order that the periods of withholding and Tariff Commission considera-
tion can coincide.
In this posture, the determination must come early-before the litigation would have
been concluded in the manner of prior practice-so that the contemporaneous commence-
ment of withholding will not be long delayed, which would possibly violate the statutory
requirement to begin withholding as soon as there is "reason to believe or suspect" the
existence of dumping. See note 118 supra. The practical procedure would then conform
to the prior practice, whereunder the Treasury usually issued the withholding order at
the time of making its tentative determination of dumping sales. See note 112 supra. The
conclusion seems inescapable that the design of the regulations contemplates the conduct
of much of the actual litigation after the affirmative determination is made.
Although there may often be merit in announcing administrative decisions tentatively
and allowing supplementation of evidence and argument thereafter, see W. GELLHOa &
C. BYsE, ADmINsmAnivE LAW 748-50 (4th ed. 1960), it would seem questionable practice
to regularize the reopening of determinations but at the same time to treat those deter-
minations as final for the purpose of bringing about consequences (here, reference to the
Tariff Commission) that may flow only from a final determination.
Despite Regulations § 53.89, and all the rest of this scheme designed to reconcile
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speed up the affirmative determination so that withholding can (con-
currently) begin at an early stage to stem dumping sales, to cast the
determination in a definitive form so that jurisdiction can be vested
straightaway in the Tariff Commission, and to comply at least super-
ficially with the Code's requirement that evidence of dumping sales
and of injury be considered simultaneously after the date on which
withholding may first be ordered.121 Although the draftsmen's adroit-
ness in tracking a course between statute and Code is awesome, 122 it may
be seriously doubted that their new arrangement comports with the
statutory stipulation that the Secretary make his determination and
the Tariff Commission make its determination "thereafter."'123 If the
new regulations are administered as I have construed them, however,
they will probably result in getting the case to the Tariff Commission
faster than previously, thereby reducing the overall time necessary to
conclude the entire antidumping proceeding.
Another aspect of withholding of appraisement which is subjected
to uncertainty by the new regulations is that of retroactive applica-
tion. Retroactivity of withholding (as distinct from retroactive applica-
tion of the dumping duty itself) 24 is the withholding of appraisement
on goods which were entered but for some reason had not yet been
appraised before publication of the withholding notice. 25 The statute
is open to the construction that retroactive application of withholding
is mandatory, although there may be discretion in the Treasury as to
divergent requirements, it may well be doubted that the Treasury will lightly revoke
its determinations. To do so could provoke a dispute with the Tariff Commission, which
might contend that the power of the Secretary to dose the case (by revocation) is abated
during the period in which the Commission is seized of the injury question.
121 Code art. 5(b) mandates simultanous consideration of both dumping sales and
injury "starting on a date not later than the earliest date on which provisional measures
may be applied." (Emphasis added.) If as suggested (see text accompanying note 118 supra)
the Act should be construed to require withholding to begin before the Secretary makes
his final determination, compliance with this provision of the Code would not seem pos-
sible, since neither the Secretary nor the Tariff Commission would have authority to
consider the merits of the injury issue during the interim between commencement of
withholding and issuance of the Secretary's determination in a form sufficient to allow
reference to the Tariff Commission. See notes 119, 114 supra; T~Amrr Colm'N REPORT ON
ThM CODE, supra note 55, at 25.
122 It seems not too much to say that the relevant portions of the regulations-
interrelated to the point of demanding pick-lock dissection to understand them-represent
the work product of skilled and honorable legal craftsmen who have been forced to resolve
the divergent influences of the Act, the Code, administrative due process, and prior prac-
tice in an essentially deceptive way.
123 Act § 201(a), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964). See TMuRr CoMM'N REPORT ON nmx CODE
22-25.
124 On retroactive application of the special dumping duty, see note 158 infra.
125 See Hendrick, in COMBENDIUM 160; Conner & Buschlinger, supra note 52, at 129,
131-32.
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the period of time within which goods must have entered to be sub-
jected to withholding.126 Under the prior practice, withholding was
applied retroactively in some circumstances but not in others.127 The
language of the Code seems to preclude all retroactive application of
provisional measures like withholding.128 The 1968 Treasury regula-
tions hedge the question, providing that appraisement shall be with-
held on merchandise entered after the date on which the notice of
withholding is published, "unless the [notice] specifies a different effec-
tive date."'129 Obviously, if withholding is not made retroactive, goods
can entirely avoid dumping duties if they can enter and obtain appraise-
ment at any time up to the date of the Secretary's determination and
the concurrent announcement of withholding.
130
In their upshot, then, the new regulations have moved in the anti-
protectionist direction contemplated by the limiting provisions of the
Code: the duration of withholding is shortened, retroactive application
of withholding is apparently diminished, and the overall proceeding is
speeded up.
D. The Injury Determination
When it receives advice that the Secretary of the Treasury has
determined the existence of dumping sales,'8 ' the United States Tariff
Commission3 2 will determine "whether an industry in the United
128 See the text of the relevant statute, Act § 201(b), 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964), supra
note 97. The argument for discretion, of course, rests on the words "under such regula-
tions as he may prescribe." See note 108 supra. Such discretion seems to be assumed in the
statement of the "Executive Branch," International Antidumping Code Hearing, supra
note 54, at 279, 312. The date on which "the question of dumping has been raised . . .
or presented," Act § 201(b), 68 Stat. 1139 (1958), 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964), from which the
120-day period is counted back, is to be specified in the Commissioner of Customs' initial
Antidumping Proceeding Notice. Regulations § 53.30(b).
127 19 C.F.R. § 14.9 (1967). Withholding was applied retroactively, between 1964 and
1968, only when the exporter and importer were "related." Conner & Buschlinger, supra
note 52, at 129; Coudert, supra note 52, at 199; see Act § 207, 19 U.S.C. § 166 (1964).
128 Article 11 of the Code states that provisional measures shall only be applied to
products that enter for consumption after the date of the decision to apply the provi-
sional measures; the exceptions enumerated in art. 11 allow retroactive application of
antidumping duties but not of provisional measures.
129 Regulations § 53.48(a). When the regulations were in proposed form, they did
not include the phrase quoted in the text, and made no provision whatsoever for retro-
active application of withholding. Proposed Regulations § 53A8(a), 32 Fed. Reg. 14,960
(1967). The regulations do not retain the distinction cited in note 127 supra.
130 To the extent withholding is not applied retroactively, the inhibitory effects of
withholding, see pp. 187-88 supra, might be somewhat eased. See Conner & Buschlinger,
supra note 52, at 131-32.
181 See Regulations § 53.38.
182 The Commission is an independent agency of the United States, composed of
six commissioners. See Tariff Act of 1950, § 550, 19 U.S.C. § 1350 (1964).
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States is being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being
established, by reason of the importation" of the differentially-priced
products. 133 Neither the statute nor the Tariff Commission's regula-
tions' 34 afford any further specification of what is meant by "injury"
(or by "industry"). Congress has repeatedly refused to enact statutory
elaboration of these terms.
135
Important definitional standards concerning these terms are em-
bodied in the new Code.136 The Code standards, if applied by the
Tariff Commission, would generally tend to narrow the applicability
of the Antidumping Act as it has been interpreted in the past. 137 In
a report to the Senate Finance Committee dated March 13, 1968, a
majority of the Tariff Commission expressed the view that, since the
Code does not have the force of domestic law in the United States with-
out implementing legislation, it cannot control Tariff Commission
decisions interpreting or applying the statutory terms. 13 Until such
time as the Code standards may be adopted by the Commission, then,
the construction of the injury aspect of the Antidumping Act must
continue to be sought in the actions and statements of the Commis-
sion.'39 The work of the Commission in this field has been well treated
elsewhere,' 40 and will receive only summary description here.
133 Act § 201(a), 68 Stat. 1138 (1954), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964). Apparently there has
never been a serious claim that dumping has "prevented the establishment" of an indus-
try. TARIFF COMM'N REPORT ON THE CODE, supra note 55, at 13. For statistics on the Com-
mission's disposition of injury questions during the period 1955-1966, see Hendrick, in
COMPENDIUM 177, 170.
134 19 C.F.R. §§ 208.1-208.6 (1967). The regulations are brief (less than one page),
terse, and wholly procedural in content. The Commission apparently contemplates no
amendments to these regulations as a result of the coming into force of the Code. TAR
COMM'N REPORT ON THE CODE 33.
135 See, e.g., S. 2241 & H.R. 8886, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 10832, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1964); H.R. 979, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. 2045 & H.R. 8510, 89th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1965); S. 1726, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
136 The most significant Code provisions concerning injury are those specifying the
circumstances in which remediable injury may be found (art. 3(a) requires that the
dumped imports be "demonstrably the principal cause of material injury') and defining
the scope of a domestic industry. Code art. 4. These standards are not, of course, reflected
in the new Treasury regulations, which deal only with those aspects of antidumping
proceedings conducted by the Treasury and do not purport to affect Tariff Commission
proceedings.
137 See TAsRr COMM'N REPORT ON THE CODE, supra note 55, at 10-21.
138 Id. at 32-33; see note 66 supra.
139 The Commission majority did make the laconic statement that the Code might
"prompt useful reconsideration of the procedures promulgated under existing law to con-
form them with the Code to the extent necessary . TARurr COMm'N REPORT ON THE
CODE 33 (emphasis added).
140 See Hendrick, in COMPENDIUM 170-76; Baier, Substantive Interpretations Under
the Antidumping Act and the Foreign Trade Policy of the United States, 17 STAN. L. REv.
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The relevant "industry" will usually comprise all American pro-
ducers. 141 Where, however, most of the producers sell only in geo-
graphically limited markets-especially where high transportation costs
inhibit expansion of those markets-the relevant industry may consist
of the producers within affected regions.142 There can also be segmenta-
tion on a product-line basis: if a manufacturer makes several products,
only its subdivisions making products similar to the dumped goods and
competitive with them will be included in the relevant industry.143
No presumption of "injury" arises from the fact that goods are
sold at differentially low prices; 144 the dumping must be shown to cause
an injury.145 Although one recent case has suggested otherwise,146 the
409, 417-26, 453-56 (1965); Coudert, supra note 52, at 204-16; Conner & Buschlinger, supra
note 52, at 132-37; Comment, supra note 52.
141 E.g., European Steel Wire Rod Cases, 28 Fed. Reg. 7368, 6476, 6474, 6606 (1963);
White Portland Cement from Japan, 29 Fed. Reg. 9636 (1964). In Steel Jacks from Canada,
31 Fed. Reg. 11,197 (1966), the sole United States producer of similar tools was regarded
as constituting the industry.
142 E.g., Cast Iron Soil Pipe from Poland, 32 Fed. Reg. 12,925 (1967) (area around Los
Angeles and around New York and Philadelphia); Carbon Steel Bars and Shapes from
Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 12,599 (1964) (Northwestern U.S.); Steel Reinforcing Bars from
Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 3840 (1964) (Oregon and Washington); Portland Cement from the
Dominican Republic, 28 Fed. Reg. 4047 (1963) (Puerto Rico and New York City); cf. Euro-
pean Steel Wire Rod Cases, 28 Fed. Reg. 7368, 6476, 6474, 6606 (1963). The Tariff Com-
mission's interpretation of the statutory words "industry in the United States" to allow
geographical segmentation of an industry was held proper in Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v.
United States, 200 F. Supp. 302 (Cust. Ct. App. Term 1961), aff'd., 50 C.C.P.A. 36 (1963).
A majority of the Tariff Commission has expressed the view that four out of five of its
affirmative injury determinations might not have been permissibly made if the Commission
had been bound to apply the geographical provisions of the Code art. 4(a)(2)(ii). TA iur
CoNrW'N REPORT ON THE CODE 18-20. See also id. at 27-28, commenting on Code art. 8(e).
143 See general discussion in Baler, supra note 140, at 427-28. Sometimes the Commis-
sion very narrowly defines what products are "in competition with" the dumped products.
Thus, the baby carriage industry was limited to manufacturers that produced baby car-
riages with specific accessories in Plastic Baby Carriers from Japan, 29 Fed. Reg. 13,990
(1964). Sometimes different, but interchangeable, products will be considered together. See
Titanium Dioxide from France, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,467 (1963) (anatase and rutile titanium
dioxide considered together); Titanium Dioxide from Japan, 29 Fed. Reg. 5522 (1964)
(same); Nepheline Syenite from Canada, 25 Fed. Reg. 8394 (1960) (nepheline syenite and
feldspar considered together). See also art. 2(b) of the Code, commented upon in TARMU
CoAm'eN REPORT ON THE CODE 18.
144 White Portland Cement from Japan, 29 Fed. Reg. 9636 (1964); Titanium Dioxide
from France, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,467 (1963); see Hendrick, in ComPENDiuM 172. Article 3(a) of
the Code seems to require this rule: "The determination [of injury] shall in all cases be
based on positive findings and not on mere allegations or hypothetical possibilities."
145 Carbon Steel Bars and Shapes from Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 12,599 (1964); Vital
Wheat Gluten from Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 5921 (1964); European Steel Wire Rod Cases,
28 Fed Reg. 7368, 6476, 6474, 6606 (1963); see Conner & Buschlinger, supra note 52, at 137;
Note, supra note 52, at 736-37. Article 3(a) of the Code requires that the dumped imports
be "the principle cause of material injury," and also indicates that all other factors con-
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Commission has generally required that the injury be "material" or
"significant."' 147 Whenever dumped goods have been sold in the United
States at prices above or equal to the United States market price, the
Commission has not found injury. 48 The fact that American producers
have had to lower their prices in order to compete with the dumped
goods has been treated as weighty, but not conclusive, evidence of
injury.149 If the dumping has caused United States producers to operate
at a loss, or has idled their production facilities, injury has readily been
found. 150 A finding of injury is also likely if the dumped imports have
captured a significant portion of the American market, particularly if
that portion is increasing.' 51 Although the Antidumping Act does not
require a finding of predatory intent,152 the intent coupled with the
tributing to the injury should be weighed against the dumping; these requirements have
been criticized as making an injury determination less likely than under present United
States law. See TAP= COMMB'N REPORT ON THE CODE 10-15; Letter from Sen. Hartke to
other senators, reproduced in COMPENDIUM 153, 154.
146 Cast Iron Soil Pipe from Poland, 32 Fed, Reg. 12,925 (1967), decided just two
months after the International Antidumping Code was signed.
'47 E.g., White Portland Cement from Japan, 29 Fed. Reg. 9636 (1964); Titanium
Dioxide from France, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,467 (1963); Bicycles from Hungary, 30 Fed. Reg.
3341 (1965). See also Cast Iron Soil Pipe from Poland, 32 Fed. Reg. 12,925, 12,927 n.14
(1967) (views of Comm'r Clubb). It has been doubted that the Tariff Commission's stan-
dards are as stringent as the "material injury" test expressed in art. 3(a) of the Code,
TAuRru COMm'N REPORT ON THE CODE 10-15.
Only a few cases have based an injury determination upon "likelihood of injury."
E.g., Steel Jacks from Canada, 31 Fed. Reg. 11,197 (1966); Steel Reinforcing Bars from
Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 3840 (1964); Portland Cement from the Dominican Republic, 28
Fed. Reg. 4047 (1963). The Tariff Commission has indicated that likelihood of injury
must be "dear and imminent." Cast Iron Soil Pipe from Australia, 29 Fed. Reg. 5253 (1964).
148 Plastic Baby Carriers from Japan, 29 Fed. Reg. 13,990 (1964); Vital Wheat Gluten
from Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 5921 (1964); Technical Vanillin from Canada, 28 Fed. Reg. 4048
(1963); Hendrick, in COMPENDIum 173.
149 Azobisformamide from Japan, 30 Fed. Reg. 6130 (1965); Chromic Add from Aus-
tralia, 29 Fed. Reg. 2919 (1964); Steel Reinforcing Bars from Canada, 29 Fed, Reg. 3840
(1964). In one case the inability of the Northwest regional producers to participate in a
price rise experienced by all other producers was considered injury; it was clear in the
case that this inability was due to the dumped imports. Carbon Steel Bars and Shapes
from Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 12,599 (1964).
150 Operation at a loss: Azobisformamide from Japan, 30 Fed. Reg. 6130 (1965).
Idling of capacity: Portland Cement from the Dominican Republic, 28 Fed. Reg. 4047
(1963). Cf. Plastic Sheet from the United Kingdom, 29 Fed. Reg. 13,854 (1964); White
Portland Cement from Japan, 29 Fed. Reg. 9636 (1964).
151 E.g., Carbon Steel Bars and Shapes from Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 12,599 (1964); Steel
Reinforcing Bars from Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 3840 (1964); Chromic Add from Australia,
29 Fed. Reg. 2919 (1964); Bicycles from Czechoslovakia, 25 Fed. Reg. 9782 (1960).
152 Such intent is a requisite of the criminal liability imposed by the original anti-
dumping statute. Revenue Act of 1916, § 801, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1964). See p. 161 supra.
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ability to injure or weaken competitors in the American market has
been considered evidence of injury 53 or of likelihood of injury.15
Sometimes a foreign producer will sell at a differentially low price
in order to "meet competition" in the American market. Since injury
is not found unless the dumped goods undersell those of American
producers, meeting the competition of the domestic producers is an
effective defense. 155 If the competition being met is that of a foreign
producer who is underselling domestic producers but is not dumping,
the situation is not clear. In a group of related cases involving this
issue injury was not found, but the dumping was considered an insig-
nificant factor in the disruption of the American market when measured
against the large volume of similarly low-priced but non-dumped
goods imported from another country.15 6
E. The Formal Finding and Imposition of the Special Dumping Duty
Upon an affirmative injury determination by the Tariff Commis-
sion, the Secretary of the Treasury publishes a formal "finding," specify-
ing the class or kind of merchandise upon which Customs officials are
to assess the "special dumping duty."' 57 The special duty is assessed
upon goods entered after the date of publication, and also upon goods
entered within a certain earlier period where for any reason (including
withholding of appraisement) those goods have not yet been appraised
153 E.g., Carbon Steel Bars and Shapes from Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 12,599 (1964); Port-
land Gray Cement from Portugal, 26 Fed. Reg. 10,010 (1961); Bicycles from Czechoslovakia,
25 Fed. Reg. 9782 (1960); cf. Peat Moss from Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 4843 (1964); Nepheline
Syenite from Canada, 26 Fed. Reg. 956 (1961); Tissue Paper from Finland, 23 Fed. Reg.
8891 (1958). It has been commented that it is fallacious to use predatory intent as evidence
of injury, though it may show likelihood of injury. Conner & Buschlinger, supra note
52, at 136.
154 E.g., Steel Jacks from Canada, 31 Fed. Reg. 11,197 (1966).
155 Hendrick, in CowEmNmium 174; Plastic Baby Carriers from Japan, 29 Fed. Reg.
13,990 (1964); Rayon Staple Fiber from Germany, 26 Fed. Reg. 6537 (1961); Tissue Paper
from Finland, 23 Fed. Reg. 8891 (1958). If the "competition" being met is itself being
dumped, the defense is unavailable. Portland Gray Cement from Portugal, 26 Fed. Reg.
10,010 (1961).
156 European Steel Wire Rod Cases, 28 Fed. Reg. 7368, 6476, 6474, 6606 (1963). The
decisions also held it immaterial whether the dumped or the non-dumped imports first
started selling in the U. S. market. It has been argued that the defense allowed by these
cases enables the dumper and non-dumper together to destroy the United States producers
and bring about an ultimate monopoly for the non-dumper, Note, supra note 52, at
737-38. But if the non-dumper has the productive capacity to take over the dumper's share
of the U. S. market, absence of the dumper would not prevent any tendency toward
monopoly, and indeed might hasten it.




by the date on which the finding is published.158 As long as the dumping
finding remains in force, Customs officials examine each shipment to
determine whether it is sold at a dumping price;159 the amount of the
duty assessed upon each importation will equal the margin of price
difference so found, reckoned as of the date of purchase. 160 If the dump-
ing has stopped or other relevant conditions have changed, the Secre-
tary (on his own initiative or upon application of interested persons)
may revoke or modify the dumping finding.161
Judicial review of a negative determination is not expressly made
available to the complaining domestic industry;162 the importer, how-
ever, can appeal an affirmative finding to the Customs Court.
16 3
III
A PROPOSED APPROACH TO THE DETERMINATION OF FAIR VALUE
IN RESPONSE TO STATE INTERVENTION IN THE EXPORTING ECONOMY-
ILLUSTRATED BY REFERENCE TO YUGOSLAVIA
I wish now to narrow the discussion to the field of the price com-
parison inquiry, which should be sharpened to take more realistic
158 Act § 202(a), 19 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1964). The regulations fully apply the provisions
of the statute to require assessment of the antidumping duty against goods entered as
early as 120 days before the "date on which the question of dumping was raised or
presented," Regulations § 58.S0(b), provided they have not been appraised prior to publi-
cation of the finding imposing the antidumping duty. Id. § 53.56(a). Such retroactivity
appears to go somewhat beyond that authorized by the exceptions enumerated in art. 11
of the Code. Of course, the practical effect of the retroactivity rule will depend in the
particular case upon the promptness with which withholding of appraisement was begun,
and also, to some extent, upon whether the withholding itself was retroactively applied. See
notes 129, 130 supra.
159 Regulations § 53.56(a).
160 Id. § 58359; Act §§ 202(a), 209, 19 U.S.C. §§ 161(a), 168 (1964) The statement in the
text is phrased to avoid terminological complications arising from the fact that the exis-
tence of dumping sales is determined by the Secretary on the basis of "fair value" while
the dumping duty is assessed against particular importations by reference to "foreign
market value" (or, if such a value cannot be ascertained, "constructed value'), which may
or may not be just the same as "fair value." See Hendrick, in CoMPENDIUM 169.
If the foreign exporter or producer has promised to reimburse the importer for any
dumping duties paid, the computation is adjusted so that the amount to be reimbursed
is itself assessable as a dumping duty. Regulations § 53.52; Hendrick, in COMPENDIUm
168-69.
161 Regulations § 53.41. The provision for revocation by the Secretary on his own
initiative expresses prior practice, see Hendrick, in CoMPENDIum 170, and conforms to
art. 9(b) of the Code.
162 On the possible availability of review under the Administrative Procedure Act
1 0, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-06 (1967), see Coudert, supra note 52, at 203-04; Note, supra note
52, at 745-48; Kohn, supra note 52, at 422-27.
163 Act § 210, 19 U.S.C. § 169 (1964); see 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514, 1515 (1964) (protest and
review of Customs officials' decisions).
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account of the nature and structure of the economies from which al-
legedly dumped goods come. As many national economies-communist
and non-communist-move away from the Smithian free-enterprise
market-economy model, their deviant features present important eco-
nomic issues that ought to be openly dealt with, to a degree far beyond
what is now done, in ascertaining "fair value."'164
More specifically, I shall consider the relevance to the fair value
determination of measures of state intervention in the domestic econ-
omy of the exporting country.'65 Obviously, state intervention exists
most pervasively in communist countries. But if Britain institutes a
comprehensive system of price ceilings, or the French government
engages itself directly in the production and sale of Renault automo-
biles, or the Italian government subsidizes new industries in the Mezzo-
giorno-should such facts be ignored by the Treasury in making its
price comparison? The joint American-Yugoslav forum before which I
was asked to present this paper has offered a fortunate occasion to
examine these issues. The fascinatingly mixed economy of Yugoslavia
affords an apt vehicle for exploring the fashion in which the Treasury
might most appropriately respond to diverse measures of state inter-
vention. The study has direct policy connotations for the question of
how to determine the fair value of the products of Yugoslavia and of
other Eastern European countries, some of which have recently begun
to follow Yugoslavia's lead away from orthodox communist dirigism and
toward a market economy 66 But the analysis reaches more broadly, and
can be applied to the products of any country, communist or "free," in
164 The Tariff Commission performs its injury determination, of course, by examin-
ing the circumstances of the relevant domestic American industry, and has little occasion
to be concerned with the nature of the exporting economy. Imaginative counsel might,
however, find ways to relate to the issue of "predatory intent," see notes 152-54 supra,
characteristic practices of statist economies that may encourage dumping, such as setting
export quotas, acquiring convertible currencies, or implementing "cold war" policies. See
Feller, The Antidumping Act and the Future of East-West Trade, 66 MicH. L. REv. 115,
121-22 (1967); Fensterwald, United States Policies Toward State Trading, 24 LAw & CoN-
ai'm. PRoB. 369, 378-79 (1959); Hazard, State Trading in History and Theory, 24 LAw &
CoNTrEMP. PROB. 243, 246 (1959); Wilczynski, Dumping and Central Planning, 74 J. POL.
EcoN. 250, 251 (1966); Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination:
United States Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLum. L. REv. 44, 49 n.26
(1958). In determining that no injury existed or was likely in cases involving communist-
country exports, on the other hand, the Commission has cited the "ideological objections"
of Americans to use of the product. Window Glass from U.S.S.R., 29 Fed. Reg. 13,581,
13,582 (1964). See also Leather Workshoes from Czechoslovakia, 31 Fed. Reg. 10,906
(1966).
165 Private monopoly or oligopoly represents another form, not state-induced, by
which the purity of the market-economy model can be diluted. See pp. 168-69 supra and
p. 230 infra.
166 On the movement toward freer markets in Eastern Europe, see the references
cited note 210 infra.
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which state intervention markedly alters the action of an open market
economy.
The published Treasury decisions, which are exceedingly terse, do
not intimate the slightest concern with the possible relevance of such
macroeconomic phenomena as price control, state trading, or subsidies
in the national economies from which the allegedly dumped goods are
exported. When it is remembered that the central term "fair value" is
nowhere defined in the Act,16 and that the Secretary of the Treasury
at least arguably possesses authority to make regulations giving detailed
content to such a term, 68 there appears to exist an ample scope for the
Secretary to refine the present tests to take realistic account of acts of
state intervention that might distort fair-value determinations. The sole
inquiry of this nature that has yet been articulated, however, is the
quite simplistic one of whether the allegedly dumped goods come from
a "controlled economy country."
A. The Present Fair Value Test for the Products of "Controlled
Economy Countries"
The Treasury has evolved a special test of fair value for the
products of countries having "controlled economies," and has consis-
tently through the 1960's applied it to merchandise exported from
communist nations other than Yugoslavia. 69 The measure is the price
in the home market of a "non-state-controlled-economy country," or,
167 The term appears only in § 201 of the Act. 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1964). The Trea-
sury, in a 1957 report to Congress, quoted in Ehrenhaft, supra note 164, at 63, declared
that the price comparison between fair value and purchase price is nothing more than
"an exercise in arithmetic." It is a theme of part III of this article that some sophisticated
economic analysis must be undergone, to ascertain the most apt measure of fair value,
before the simple arithmetic can be performed.
168 Act § 407, 19 U.S.C. § 173 (1964), quoted in note 118 supra.
169 Jalousie-Louvre-Sized Sheet Glass from Czechoslovakia, 27 Fed. Reg. 8457 (1962),
was the first decision stating that this test was being used. The special test had apparently
previously been used in Bicycles from Czechoslovakia, 25 Fed. Reg. 6657 (1960), although
no mention of it was made in the opinion. See Feller, supra note 164, at 130 n.65. Other
cases in which the special test of fair value has been used are: Titanium Sponge from
the U.S.S.R., 33 Fed. Reg. 5467, 5960, 6377 (1968); Pig Iron from Czechoslovakia, 33 Fed.
Reg. 5105, 9375 (1968); Pig Iron from East Germany, 33 Fed. Reg. 5105, 9375 (1968); Pig
Iron from Romania, 33 Fed. Reg. 5105, 9375 (1968); Pig Iron from U.S.S.R., 33 Fed. Reg.
5106, 9376 (1968); Cast Iron Soil Pipe and Fittings from Poland, 32 Fed. Reg. 2901, 8250
(1967); Pig Iron from Czechoslovakia, 32 Fed. Reg. 2901 (1967); Fishery Products from
U.S.S.R., 32 Fed. Reg. 1101, 5375 (1967); Fur Felt Hat Bodies from Czechoslovakia, 31 Fed.
Reg. 15,024 (1966); Shoes from Czechoslovakia, 31 Fed. Reg. 1207, 7087 (1966); Window
Glass from Czechosovakia, 29 Fed. Reg. 13,405 (1964); Window Glass from U.S.S.R., 29
Fed. Reg. 8381 (1964); Portland Cement from Poland; 28 Fed. Reg. 6660 (1963); Fur Felt
Hoods, Bodies, and Caps from Czechoslovakia, 27 Fed. Reg. 6099 (1962).
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alternatively, the price at which such third country sells at export.170
For the ensuing discussion, it is useful to distinguish this "third-country
price" test from the "normal" tests of fair value-namely, home-market
price, export price, and constructed value.171
All of the cases in which this test was used have involved the
products of Eastern European countries (that is, none has involved
Cuba or the Asian communist areas), 172 and the third country whose
price was used has in almost every case been Western European.173 Pre-
sumably the Western European nation chosen is the one in which
general economic conditions are thought to be most similar to those of
the exporting country.174 The Western European price is adjusted for
transportation costs, and for measurable differences in quality and pro-
duction efficiency, before the price comparison is made.175
1. Statutory Basis of the Third-Country Price Test
There is little authority from which to glean the statutory prove-
nance of the special measure of value that is applied to the products of
170 Regulations § 53.5(b). The regulations contained nothing explicit about con-
trolled economies, or about the test of fair value to be applied to their products, until
1968. Under both the prior practice and the scheme of the new regulations, the special test
is regarded as a form of "constructed value." In obeisance to the statutory standards of
constructed value, Act § 206, 19 U.S.C. § 165 (1964), the new Regulation § 53.5(b) specifies
that the value is reckoned "on the normal costs, expenses, and profits as reflected by" the
prices in a non-controlled economy. For all practical purposes, however, the quoted lan-
guage could probably be omitted without loss of intended meaning.
The price at which the non-controlled countries (France and Mexico) sold similar
merchandise for expori to the United States was used as the test of fair value in Cast Iron
Soil Pipe and Fittings from Poland, 32 Fed. Reg. 2901 (1967).
The second supplementary provision to para. 1, ad art. VI of annex I to GATT recog-
nizes that "a strict comparison with domestic prices ... may not always be appropriate"
"in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or substantially complete
monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State .... The Code's
limitations on how the price comparison may be made are "without prejudice" to the
provision just quoted. Code art. 2(g).
171 See pp. 184-85 supra.
172 Imports from mainland China, Cuba, North Korea, and North Vietnam are pro-
hibited (with certain exceptions) by the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§
500.204, 500.536 (1967), and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.204,
515.536 (1967), issued pursuant to the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, § 5, 50 U.S.C.
app. § 5 (1964).
173 But see Cast Iron Soil Pipe and Fittings from Poland, 32 Fed. Reg. 2901 (1967)
(Mexico); Fishery Products from U.S.S.R., 32 Fed. Reg. 1101, 5375 (1967) (Kuwait).
174 See Feller, supra note 164, at 132. Mr. Feller's article, which carries the authority
of the author's experience in the Office of the General Counsel of the Treasury Department,
is a valuable source of information and analysis concerning the practice and problems
involved in communist-country dumping investigations.
175 E.g., Cast Iron Soil Pipe and Fittings from Poland, 32 Fed. Reg. 2901 (1967); Shoes
from Czechoslovakia, 31 Fed. Reg. 1207, 7087 (1966); Window' Glass from Czechoslovakia, 29
Fed. Reg. 13,405 (1964). See Feller, supra note 164, at 130-31.
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communist states. The nearest hint afforded by the decisions is the
single statement in one case that home-market sales of cement in Poland
were "not made in the ordinary course of trade within the meaning of
the statute," and therefore that the home-market price should not be
used.176 The Treasury apparently on parallel grounds also automatic-
ally dismisses the use of a communist country's price for export to
countries other than the United States, even though that price may
have been arrived at by bargaining with a third-country purchaser not
subject to the communist exporting country's control.
77
The rationale evidently derives from a statutory provision, incor-
porated by the regulations to define the home-market price and export
price used to measure fair value, which stipulates that those prices must
be based on sales "in the ordinary course of trade."'17 In J. H. Cottman
Co. v. United States,179 the only reported judicial pronouncement on
176 Portland Cement from Poland, 28 Fed. Reg. 6660 (1963).
177 See Feller, supra note 164, at 128-29, arguing that the export price (which he terms
the "third-country price') is subject to quite different considerations from those affecting
the home-market price in communist countries, and indeed that the export price ought
to be taken as the usual test of fair value for communist-economy products.
178 "[F]oreign market value of imported merchandise shall be the price . . . at
which such or similar merchandise is sold ... in the principal markets of the country from
which exported, in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade for
home consumption (or ... for sale for exportation to countries other than the United
States) ...." Act § 205, 72 Stat. 584 (1958), 19 U.S.C. § 164 (1964). This standard of "for-
eign market value," which is established to measure the special dumping duty to be as-
sessed on particular shipments rather than to test initially for the existence of sales below
fair value, is incorporated into the Regulations' statement of the home-market price test,
§ 53.3(a), and of the export price test. Regulations § 53.4(a). For the prior similar practices,
see 19 C.F.R. §§ 14.7(a)(l)-(2) (1967); HousE WAYS & MEANS SUacOnMM. ON CUSToMs, TAIFus,
AND REcriRocAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, REPORT ON UNITED STATEs CusToMs, TARIFF, AND
TRADE AGREEMENT LAWS AND TsuRn ADMINISTRATION, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 92-93 (Comm.
Print 1957). The term "sold or, in the absence of sales, offered for sale" is qualified by the
statute to mean sales or offers "in the ordinary course of trade to one or more selected pur-
chasers at wholesale at a price which fairly reflects the market value of the merchandise
.... ", Act § 212(l)(B), 72 Stat. 586 (1958), 19 U.S.C. § 170a(l)(B) (1964), and the term
"ordinary course of trade" is itself defined to mean "the conditions and practices which,
for a reasonable time prior to the exportation of the merchandise under consideration,
have been normal in the trade under consideration ..... Act § 212(2), 72 Stat. 586
(1958), 19 U.S.C. § 170a(2) (1964).
The Code's definition of dumping speaks of the "comparable price, in the ordinary
course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting
country." Art. 2(a); see Art. 2(d). The Code offers no definition of the term "ordinary
course of trade."
Proposals by Senator Humphrey and Representative Herlong to amend the Act to
deal explicitly with the products of countries "dominated or controlled by communism"
are discussed in Coudert, The Application of the United States Antidumping Law in the
Light of a Liberal Trade Policy, 65 COLUm. L. REV. 189, 225-26 n.237 (1965).
179 20 C.C.P.A. 344 (Cust. 1932).
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the relevance of state intervention to the price comparison question,18 0
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that a Moroccan gov-
ernment monopoly's sales of phosphates that were restricted against
resale were not made "in the ordinary course of trade," and declared
that sales, to form an appropriate basis for comparison, must be made
in a "free, open, unrestricted market . . . under normal competitive
conditions."'"
Having rejected the preferred home-market price and export price
tests of fair value, the Treasury was left with using a constructed value,
which under the statute is supposed to be computed by reference to the
costs, expenses and profits of the exporting producer. The Treasury
seems in all the communist-country cases to have found or assumed an
"absence of information as to the actual costs .. expenses and
profit,"'182 and therefore has turned to a third-country price, apparently
on the theory that it is the "best evidence available" as to such com-
ponent figures. 188 The "best evidence available" criterion, however,
functions in the statute only to enable the Treasury to disregard trans-
actions between related persons,184 and it has been doubted that typical
transactions within communist countries are between related persons
within the definitions of the Act8 5 to justify the use of a Western
European price instead of a constructed value based on actual costs,
expenses and profits in the exporting communist country.188 A firmer
statutory ground might be found in the statutory definition of "con-
structed value," which requires that the figures used in computing that
value reflect transactions "in the ordinary course of trade" or "in the
ordinary course of business."'18 7 Because any available figures reflect
transactions that are not "in the ordinary course," the Treasury has no
180 Actually the case was concerned not with the initial comparison of prices to
determine the existence of dumping sales, but rather with the specific assessment of
antidumping duties against the shipment in question. An examination of the opinions
in this tortuous litigation (the case went to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
three times) fails to disclose what test the Treasury finally did use to compute the margin of
dumping. United States v. J. H. Cottman & Co., 18 C.C.P.A. 132 (Cust. 1930); J. H.
Cottman &c Co. v. United States, 20 C.C.P.A. 344 (Cust. 1932); United States v. J. H.
Cottman & Co., 23 C.C.P.A. 378 (Cust. 1936).
181 20 C.C.P.A. at 357.
182 Jalousie-Louvre-Sized Sheet Glass from Czechoslovakia, 27 Fed. Reg. 8457 (1962).
183 See Feller, supra note 164, at 129-30, 126.
184 Act § 206(b), 19 U.S.C. § 165(b) (1964).
185 Id. § 205(c), 19 U.S.C. § 165(c) (1964).
188 Feller, supra note 164, at 129-31; cf. Coudert, supra note 178, at 226.
187 The costs of materials and of fabrication or other processing are based upon
production "in the ordinary course of business," Act § 206(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 165(a)(1)
(1964); the amounts for general expenses and profits are those reflected in sales "in the
ordinary course of trade." Id. § 206(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 165(a)(2) (1964).
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choice but to disregard figures from the exporting economy and simply
to do the best it can to construct the value in some other manner con-
sistent with the spirit of the Act. 8 8
2. The Economic Premises of the Test
The practical rationale for using the third-country price test, on
the other hand, seems fairly clear. Prices in a "controlled" economy are
often the instruments of social and political engineering, and may be
set at artificial levels for reasons having nothing to do with natural
economic relationships as those would be judged in a free-market
economy. Such prices are not "in mutual communication" with the
prices at which the allegedly dumped goods are exported, and thus a
legitimate economic comparison is precluded. 189 More pointedly, the
purposes of the Antidumping Act would be frustrated if the Treasury
were required to ascertain fair value by reference to an uneconomically
low home-market price set by a state-run enterprise that had behind it
the potentially unlimited financial power of the state to absorb losses
(and, incidentally, to finance dumping for political reasons).1 0 The
same would be true if constructed value had to be computed from
artificially determined domestic cost figures.
By resorting to a third-country price as its referent, however, the
Treasury altogether bypasses any inquiry into the economic validity of
the domestic figures in the exporting communist economy. The Trea-
sury itself is acting at least somewhat imprecisely and artificially, since
it has no way of knowing whether the particular third-country price
chosen is really too high or too low.191
3. The Criteria of "State Control"
In what circumstances is this practical although undoubtedly some-
what crude test to be employed? The Treasury's criteria of a "controlled
economy" are left wholly unarticulated in the decisions and the regula-
tions. So far as I have determined, no non-communist country has been
188 The statutory definition of "constructed value" does not specify how the Treasury
is to proceed either when information as to costs, expenses and profits is unavailable
or when that information reflects transactions that are not in the "ordinary course!' Act §
206, 19 U.S.C. § 165 (1964). Regulation § 53.5 does not close this gap. The Treasury has
apparently acknowledged the shaky basis of its third-country price test. See Coudert, supra
note 178, at 226-27.
189 See Feller, supra note 164, at 126.
190 See Wilczynski, supra note 164, at 251-52, 261. It has been argued that communist
countries cannot be relied upon as a dependable source of goods or materials. Fensterwald,
supra note 164, at 379-80.
191 See Feller, supra note 164, at 131-32. See also note 209 infra.
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treated as possessing such an economy by having the third-country price
test applied to its products. From the cryptic opinions in the cases, 192
one is tempted to conclude that communist economies are treated as
"controlled" because "everybody knows they are." The 1968 regula-
tions, embodying for the first time specific mention of the third-country
price test, yield no fresh guidance about what factors may determine
whether an economy is controlled. "Ordinarily," the third-country
price is to be utilized where the exporting country's economy "is
controlled to an extent that sales . . . do not permit a determination
of fair value under [the home-market price or the export price tests].'
1 98
B. A Suggested New Approach to "State Control" Questions
Even though the new regulation is cast in terms that almost
entirely beg the question, one might discern in its language the germ
of a new approach to the problem of state influence. The threshold
inquiry would no longer be simply whether the entire economy is "con-
trolled" vel non, but rather would become one of assessing the degree
to which "control" affects the particular product in issue. The Treasury
would consider whether the ordinances of state intervention operate to
affect the pricing of the allegedly dumped product "to an extent" that
renders the normal tests of fair value inappropriate. On this view the
new regulation can furnish a foundation for the more refined and
explicit consideration of macroeconomic facts that I believe the price
comparison demands in such cases.
The fundamental economic inquiry should be whether, in the
circumstances of each case, state interference distorts the relationship
that the home price of the goods in question would bear to other prices
under a generally free market economic system.
1. The Economic Measure of Value
The price comparison determination under the scheme of the Act
is essentially a matter of relating economic values. Western economists
have recoguized that the value of any product or service or factor of
production is always a relative one, and must be measured in terms of
the relation its price bears to other prices on the open market. There
192 Only comparatively recently have the Treasury's opinions made explicit the
thought that the third-country test is used because the communist exporting country has
a "controlled economy." Fur Felt Hat Bodies from Czechoslovakia, 31 Fed. Reg. 15,024
(1966), seems to be the first instance. In more recent cases, the Treasury has spoken of a
"state-controlled-economy country." Eg., Titanium Sponge from the U.S.S.R., 33 Fed. Reg.
5467 (1968); Cast Iron Soil Pipe and Fittings from Poland, 32 Fed. Reg. 2901 (1967).
193 Regulations j 53.5(b).
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can be no other, absolute measure of value, such as might be sought by
reference to the factors (like labor) that go into a product.194 Labor or
any other factor of production has economic interchangeability, afford-
ing it multiple opportunities to contribute to a variety of outputs and
thereby to earn alternative rewards. 195 It will earn higher rewards in
some uses than in others. Since its own value will vary with the use to
which it is in fact put, no factor of production (singly or in combina-
tion) can supply an absolute measure of the value of the products it
may help bring into being. The measure of value therefore can only be
supplied by the market, which commensurates in money terms the
relative values of products and of the factors that go into producing
them.1
96
Even in cases where the state has interfered with the economy,
then, there is at bottom no valid alternative to a free market as the
touchstone for measuring value.197 The Treasury has evidently pro-
ceeded upon such a premise in the communist-country cases, taking its
measure of value from "non-controlled" economies where the market
presumably operates more freely. But its technique seems an inartistic
one. The Treasury has simply assumed that the home price in a com-
munist country can never furnish an economically sound measure of
fair value, without pausing to ask whether there may be free-market
criteria by which to test the economic validity of that home-market
price. It therefore has been forced to use a price drawn from an entirely
separate economy. Conversely, in cases involving non-communist coun-
tries, the Treasury appears to take no account of regimes of state
intervention that might render the home-market price unreliable,
under free-market criteria, as a measure of value.
To serve the Act's balanced trade policy, which is to restrict
imports priced below value but not those whose low price stems from
a genuine economic advantage, it is critical to have as precise a measure
of value as possible. The problem divides into two parts. First is the
question of how the Treasury might more accurately decide whether it
can validly use the home-market price (or home-economy constructed
value) of a product which may be affected by state intervention. The
second question is whether, in cases where it has been decided that price
or cost figures from the exporting economy cannot be validly used,
194 See P. SAMU,.SON, ECONOMrcs 712-13, 27-29 (7th ed. 1967).
195 See id. at 443-44.
196 See id. at 611-17.
197 Reliance on free-market standards of value seems to be an implicit premise of
the Antidumping Act. See the statutory definitions quoted in note 178 supra.
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there is a more exact alternative standard of value than the third-
country price now employed by the Treasury.
2. The "Market-Basket" Technique for Validating Home-Market
Prices (or Costs) by Free-Market Standards
The special problem presented by state control is how to measure
values when prices are influenced by interference with free operation
of the home market. I suggest that the initial inquiry in each case
should be whether the home-market price in the exporting country can
in the circumstances be taken as an economically appropriate measure
of value.
Again, value can only be tested by free-market criteria. Whenever
a home-market price appears to be influenced by state control, the
Treasury should consider whether that price bears approximately the
same relationships to other prices in the exporting economy as it would
in a substantially free economy. One theoretically sound and reasonably
simple way to do this is by charting the relationships that the price of
the exported product bears to the prices of perhaps six or eight.other
commodities in the home market of the exporting country, and then
comparing those price relationships to those found by arraying the
prices of the same products in several other countries where the market
is generally free and the product in question is not directly controlled.
If the price ratios are roughly the same in both the exporting and the
"free" markets, the home-market price of the allegedly dumped product
is an economically valid one for the purposes of measuring fair value.
It is valid because it approximates the price that would be generated
if a free market prevailed in the exporting economy.
Thus, if shoes were allegedly being dumped from Yugoslavia and
it appeared that the price of shoes in the Yugoslav home market might
have been affected by state interference in the economy, the Treasury
would investigate the prices in Yugoslavia of such commodities as wheat,
steel, wool and bicycles, and note the ratios between those prices and
the price of shoes. It would then collect the prices and figure the ratios
on an identical "market basket" in (say) Italy, Austria and Greece.
Adjusting for readily-identifiable disparities and allowing for an occa-
sional aberrant relationship, the Treasury would determine whether
the ratios of shoe prices to the other prices in Yugoslavia were reason-
ably similar to the ratios in the other countries chosen. If they were,
the Yugoslav home-market price should be used to measure the fair
value of the shoes, instead of a price drawn from a wholly unrelated
third economy. But if by this test the Yugoslav shoe prices were mark-
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edly out of line with the rest of the market-basket prices, the Treasury
should conclude that state intervention has distorted the relevant eco.
nomic relationships in the Yugoslav market; a standard other than
home-market price may have to be employed to reckon the fair value.
An identical technique could be utilized to test the reliability of
the home-market prices, for example, of petroleum products subsidized
by the Italian government, or of woolens sold domestically in Great
Britain at a controlled ceiling price. In any such situation, validation
of the home price would indicate that the potentially distorting effects
of state intervention had been "washed out," as judged by free-market
criteria, in the exporting economy.
In cases where there are few or no home sales and therefore no
home-market price,198 the Treasury confronts the task of computing a
constructed value.199 In such cases, whenever it appears that measures
of state intervention have touched upon the costs of making or selling
the allegedly dumped goods, it is again desirable to enlist the market-
basket approach. The Treasury would determine whether the figures
on costs, expenses and profit are economically valid despite the state's in-
terference with the home economy. Here, concededly, the investigation
would be more detailed, since the Treasury would have to make a
separate set of price-ratio comparisons for each element of the con-
structed value. Fortunately, however, the job is somewhat simplified by
the statutory definition of constructed value, which does not require
the Treasury to itemize the costs of labor, equipment operation and
depreciation, distribution and the like; the statute specifically requires
computation only of the costs of materials, of fabrication or processing,
and of containers, and permits the computation of general expenses and
profits on the basis of the amounts usual in the country of exporta-
tion.200 Although a question of administrative feasibility is obviously
presented, it should not be impossible in particular cases to determine
whether all of the components of a constructed value are free from
significant distortion resulting from state economic action. If they are-
again-the Treasury should use the value constructed in the exporting
198 E.g., Fur Felt Hoods, Bodies, and Caps from Czechoslovakia, 27 Fed. Reg. 6099
(1962).
199 Regulations § 53.5(a). Curiously, while the premise for using constructed value
may be the absence or insufficiency of home (or export) sales from which a determination
of fair value can be drawn, the statutory definition of "constructed value" calls for use of
general expense and profit figures as "usually reflected in sales of merchandise of the
same general class. .. in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of
trade. ... Act § 206(a)(2), 72 Stat. 585 (1958), 19 U.S.C. § 165(a)(2) (1964). This anomaly
does not deter use of the constructed value when there are no home sales.
200 Act & 205, 19 U.S.C. § 165 (1964).
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economy, in preference to a third-country price taken from an entirely
separate economy.
It seems to me that the technique I have outlined offers important
advantages over the simplistic approach of deciding categorically
whether the exporting economy is "state-controlled." In cases where
the home-market price or constructed value drawn from home-economy
figures can be economically validated, the proposed technique permits
the use of fair-value tests that have full statutory authority, and lessens
reliance on the third-country price test, for which there is no express
warrant in the Act. More important, the validated home-market price
or constructed value is likely to be a more precise measure of value
than any third-country price. Since the validated figure is indigenous
to the exporting economy, it arises from the whole distinctive complex
of costs and earnings and consumption present in that economy. A third-
country price could be brought into that sort of intimate communica-
tion with the exporting economy only through adjustments that by
their nature and number would be impossible to calculate. But where
such adjustments cannot be made, there is no way of knowing whether
the third-country price is too high or too low in terms of economic
values that relate to the exporting economy. The validated home-
economy standard, further, avoids the possible distortion introduced by
the extra exchange-rate conversion that the third-country price necessi-
tates under current practice.201 Finally, the market-basket approach
offers a technique that can be applied wherever the phenomenon of
state intervention appears, in communist and non-communist countries
alike.
No doubt there can be imprecisions and administrative complica-
tions under the approach I have advanced. 202 I suppose an advantage of
the present "controlled-economy" litmus is that it avoids bewildering
the fact-finder with a multitude of complex economic data that are not
amenable to resolution by familiar methods. But one may believe that
the execution of a "market-basket" test would present no impossible
difficulty; in any event, I do not insist that it is the only. or the best
201 Currency conversions under the Antidumping Act are governed by the antidump-
ing Regulations § 53.55, a general Customs regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 16.4 (1967), and § 522
of the Tariff Act of 1930, 31 U.S.C. § 872 (1964).
202 One potential difficulty with any price comparison (whether the product is from
a communist country or not) has to do with the existence of non-standardized products.
Clearly it is easier to compare the prices of wheat than of costume jewelry. The statutory
definition of "such or similar merchandise" does not really face up to the problem. Act
§ 212(3), 19 U.S.C. § 170a(3) (1964). An ordinary case involving costume jewelry would
be difficult enough, it would become more complex if a market-basket test were used
to validate home prices before the price comparison was made.
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validating method that could be contrived by those skilled in analytical
economics. I do urge that the Treasury, in state-intervention cases,
exploit the available free-market criteria to seek out more precise stan-
dards of fair value than it now employs.
3. Application of the Market-Basket Test
All economies, obviously, experience a certain degree of state inter-
ference, the effects of which are often imperfectly visible and in any
event are hard to trace. As a theoretical matter, then, one could perhaps
declare that every home-market price should be validated by a test like
that of the market-basket price-ratio comparison, whether or not the
product is directly influenced by state intervention in the home market.
But it would be silly, as well as unduly burdensome, to apply such a
test to the freely-priced products of generally free economies. The Act,
after all, relies fundamentally on the use of home-market prices existing
in real-world economies; a marked departure from this fundamental
plan would contravene the logic of the Act.
Price validation should be considered only when the Treasury
finds by its threshold inquiry that the price in the home market appears
(at least prima facie) to be substantially affected by state intervention.
To supply certain presumptions that aid in carrying out that inquiry,
the Treasury could adapt its present distinction between economies
that are pervasively controlled and those that are not. Then it should
apply the price-ratio comparison to validate home-market prices in ac-
cordance with the following schema:
(1) Where the exporting economy is pervasively controlled, it
should be presumed that the consequences of state intervention per-
meate the economy so thoroughly that home prices are not reliable
indicators of fair value. They should not be used unless they can be
validated by the price-ratio comparison, even where the particular
product is free from direct state influence. The need for validation is
not lessened in cases where the home price is higher than the price at
which the goods are sold to the United States (which would establish
the existence of dumping sales if the home price were used to test fair
value). The high home price may be set for purely non-economic rea-
sons; if that price is found not to be valid, a lower third-country price
used as the substitute index of value may show the exported goods to be
fairly priced, in which event they should not be restricted by a dumping
duty.
(2) Where the exporting economy is generally free, it should be
presumed that the home-market price is a reliable guide to fair value,
unless the particular product appears (prima facie) to be directly sub-
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ject to state influence. In the latter situation, the need for validation by
the market-basket comparison should depend upon whether free-market
forces, despite the controls, permit the home price to stand at a level
above the price at which the allegedly dumped goods are sold to the
United States. If they do, this is all the Treasury needs to know to find
dumping sales.203 The home price derives its validity from the workings
of the home market; validation by reference to external economies
would be superfluous. But where the home price stands below the price
for export to the United States, or where it is set (rather than limited)
by the state at a higher level, it should be validated by use of the price-
ratio comparison. The distinction (more fully articulated in section E,
below) is illustrated by the case of merchandise on which a price ceiling
is imposed in an otherwise free market. If the ceiling price exceeds the
price for export to the United States, dumping is established regardless
of the fact that the home price might be even higher if there were no
controls; if the ceiling price is lower than the price at export, the pos-
sibility that an uncontrolled market might bring the price higher makes
validation necessary.
Whether the home-market price has to be validated under the
above rules or not, there may be circumstances in which adjustments
to the price should be made to compensate for the traceable effects of
certain forms of state action (such as subsidies). This idea will be
illustrated below in section E.
Parallel rules would govern the use of the constructed value stan-
dard. There, of course, the component elements of that value, rather
than a price, would have to be validated in those cases where validation
was required.
I believe this approach would give full and sound meaning to the
new regulation's standard of applying an alternate fair-value measure
when "the economy of the country . . . is controlled to an extent that
sales . . . in that country . . . do not permit a determination of fair
value" under the usual tests.204 The suggested procedure cuts the
203 To reach an afrmative fair-value determination, the Treasury need only find that
sales at less than fair value do exist; it is not essential to make an exact calculation of
the margin by which the sales to the United States are priced below fair value. Act
§ 201(a), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964); Regulations § 53.3(a). The dumping margin is relevant
only to assessment of the duty, which is computed, after the final "dumping finding" is
published (see text at note 157 supra), with respect to each shipment of the merchandise.
Regulations § 53.56; text at notes 159, 160 supra. The technique outlined in the text will
not necessarily yield an exact measure of the dumping margin, for which alternate
valuation methods may be required in particular cases.
204 Regulations § 53.5(b). The tests and criteria I have proposed might raise questions
as to their conformity to the literal provisions of the GATT provision, ad art. VI, para. 2,
quoted supra note 170. My proposals do not however appear to be out of keeping with
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present practice in two directions. For non-communist countries, there
would no longer be an uncritical acceptance of the home-market
price,205 which in particular cases might stand at an artificially low
level as a result of direct state intervention. For communist countries,
on the other hand, a home-market price could be taken as the measure
of fair value if it is validated, and would then tend to supply a more
precise measure than the third-country price heretofore utilized. Home
prices might be found to be valid most frequently in those sectors of
their economies that Eastern European states have been gradually free-
ing from direct control. Use of a home-market standard would not
necessarily benefit the communist exporting country, since its home
price might well be higher than that of the Western European country
whose price would otherwise be employed.
4. The Alternative Standard of Fair Value
If the home-market price (or constructed value) is not found to be
economically valid when tested by the price-ratio comparison, the
Treasury would have to apply an alternate standard of fair value. Under
its present practice, of course, it uses a third-country price. For reasons
already cited, such a measure of value is likely to be inexact; it may be
too high or too low, even after the customary adjustments are made,
and it introduces an additional currency conversion.2 0 6 Further, there
may be difficulties in obtaining accurate information from third-country
producers who have no direct interest in the case.20 7
It can be persuasively argued that a more exact measure could be
found in an averaged world or regional price, or, better yet, in an
average of home prices in several free-market economies in which the
product in question is free from the effects of state interference. I shall
leave this issue to be more extensively canvassed by others.208 For the
the spirit of the GATT provision, and indeed may depart from its strict terms to no
greater degree than do the Treasury's regulations and its decisions with regard to "con-
trolled economies."
205 Research has disclosed no case in which factors like price controls, state-run
enterprises or subsidies have been mentioned as relevant. In Renault Automobiles from
France, 28 Fed. Reg. 4675 (1963), home-market price was used as the measure of fair
value, but the French government's ownership of Renault was not referred to. See pp. 230-
31 infra.
206 See notes 175, 201 supra. The economic imprecisions of currency conversions may
be lessened somewhat by the communist nations' practice of quoting export prices in hard
currencies rather than in their own, but a conversion to the communist currency would
still have to be made if there were to be adjustments of the third-country price to reflect
differences in quality and production efficiency.
207 See Feller, supra note 164, at 130 n.66.
208 See the excellent discussion in Feller, id. at 133-39.
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balance of this article, I shall assume that the familiar though imprecise
third-country price will be used as the alternate measure of value. A
single third-country price, as distinct from an average of several, has
the merit of furnishing a concrete point of reference for the purpose
of adjusting for measurable differences in quality and production effi-
ciency.20
9
I turn now to a consideration of the Yugoslav economy, and of
the way its products have been treated and might be treated under the
present "control" standard and under the suggested application of the
new regulation.
C. The "Socialist Market Economy" of Yugoslavia
It should not surprise us that Yugoslavia-for centuries the cross-
roads of eastern and western cultures and latterly the home of a
uniquely independent form of communism-should possess a wholly
distinctive economic system.210 Although its economic discourse still
209 See text at note 175 supra.
One situation that seems particularly troublesome under any approach is that in which
it is suspected that the controlled exporting economy may possess a genuine comparative
advantage over all other countries. The case can be imagined, for example, in which a
communist country has an unusually plentiful or accessible supply of a certain natural
resource, which can be extracted and exported far more cheaply than could be done by
any non-controlled country. See Wilczynski, supra note 164, at 254-57. The difficulty is
how to -prove by reliable economic standards that this is truly the situation. The Trea-
sury's efforts to adjust the third-country price for differences in production efficiency may
founder on the unreliability of cost information in the controlled economy. If the com-
modity is priced reasonably in the home market, the market-basket test (which, it should
be conceded, may be less useful with respect to natural resources than for other products)
is likely to demonstrate that the home price is invalid as being too low. Alternative stan-
dards, such as regional or world price, would not increase the precision of the measure
unless the volume exported by the communist country brought that price down to its
own level. The situation seems to call for some sort of construction of value from
exporting-economy figures. (A curious anomaly of the new Regulations § 53.5(b) is that it
seems to require use of a third-country price, and to bypass entirely the use of any sort
of "regular" constructed value test, whenever the element of control renders inappropriate
the measurement of fair value by the home-market price and export price tests.) But
unless those figures could themselves be validated by the market-basket comparison, there
would remain no free-market guide to verify their validity. Perhaps the practical answer
is that any communist country with such an economic advantage will probably sell at
the higher world price, so that the question of dumping is less likely to arise.
210 Other Eastern European countries have begun, gradually and to a far lesser
extent, to emulate some of the liberalizing techniques practiced in the Yugoslav system.
See generally Burck, East Europe's Struggle for Economic Freedom, 75 FORTUNE, May 1967,
at 125; Eastern Europe Breaks Out of Its Bonds, Bus. WEna, Nov. 20, 1965, at 177; Bicanic,
Economics of Socialism in a Developed Country, 44 FOREIGN AEFAxRs 633, 643-44 (1966);
Upheaval in Czechoslovakia: Changing Climate Turns Industry Westward, 8 Bus. EURoPE,
Apr. 26, 1968, at 129. After the Soviet invasion and occupation, however, the Czechoslovak
government decided on October 24, 1968 "to abandon an experiment of creating workers'
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sometimes creaks with Marxist jargon,211 Yugoslavia has to a remark-
able extent replaced the dead hand of centralized planning and control
with the supple and diffused sovereignty of the market.212
The most striking feature of the Yugoslav economy is the extent
to which, in the name of socialism, it is given over to a system of free
(though not really private) enterprise. Autonomous firms make their
own business decisions and attempt to maximize profits in a more or
less competitive market environment.213 Direct planning, controls and
subsidies are generally being cast off.214 The means of production, on
the other hand, are "social property, '215 and there is no effective capital
councils in government-run industry. The plan was apparently canceled under Soviet
pressure." N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1968, at 5, col. 3 (city ed.).
211 See, e.g., R. STOJANOVIC, YUGOSLAV ECONOMISTS ON PROBLEMS OF A SOCIALIST ECON-
OMY 123, 140, 160 (1964); Dragicevic, Income Distribution According to Work Performed,
SoCIAuisr THOUGHT AND PRACTICE: A YuGosLAv QUARTERLY, Apr.-June 1967, at 70 (Eng.
lang. ed.).
212 For information on recent Yugoslav economic history, see generally S. PEJOviCH,
TIE MARKET-PLANNED ECONOMY OF YUGOSLAVIA (1966); G. MACESICH, YUGOSLAVIA: THE
THEORy AND PRACTICE OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING (1964); A. WATERSTON, PLANNING IN
YUGOSLAVIA (1962); Rusinow, Laissez-Faire Socialism in Yugoslavia, in AMERICAN UNIVER-
srxrIs FIELD STAFF, 14 SOUnmsrT EUROPE SERIs, No. 2 (1967); W. Friedmann, Freedom and
Planning in Yugoslavia's Economic System, 25 SLAVIC REvImw 630 (1966); ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC SURVEY: YUGOSLAVIA (annual)
[hereinafter cited as OECD]. Useful information is also found in three Yugoslav period-
icals, all of which are available in English language editions: THE NEw YUGOSLAV LAw:
BULLETIN ON LAW AND LEGISLATION (annual; articles and recent legislation); YucosLAv
SURVEY: A RECORD OF FACTS AND INFORMATION (quarterly; political, economic, and social
developments); JOURNAL OF THE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN TRADE (quarterly; international com-
merce).
213 See Rusinow, supra note 212, at 4; Friedmann, supra note 212, at 632-33. "The
working organization is an independent and autonomous organization." CONST. OF YUGO-
sLAvA art. 15, para. 1 (1963), in 7 INsTTUTrx OF COMPARATIVE LAW, COLLECTION OF YUGOSLAV
LAws (Eng. lang. ed. 1963).
214 Friedmann, supra note 212, at 631-33; Rusinow, supra note 212, at 13-14; Burck,
Adam Smitovic on the Sava, 75 FORTUNE, May 1967, at 128, 242; Samardzija, The Market
and Social Planning in the Yugoslav Economy, 7 Q. REv. ECON. & Bus., Summer 1967, at 37.
The "political factories" have continued to demand subsidies. See note 232 infra.
215 I shall not attempt a definitive statement of the unique Yugoslav concept of
"social property." One Yugoslav colleague at the Zagreb conference stated, seriously, that
there were nineteen different theories of the meaning of social property. The essential
idea is that there is no "legal title" (in the state or anyone else) to capital assets, to which
the enterprise has only a "right of use." See Peselj, Yugoslav Laws on Foreign Investments,
2 INT'L LAwYER 499, 506 (1968).
Since no one has the right of ownership over the socially-owned means of produc-
tion, neither the social-political community nor the working organization nor the
working man may appropriate in any form of ownership the product of socially-
organized work, or manage and dispose of socially-owned means of production and
work, or arbitrarily determine the terms of distribution.
CONST. OF YucosLAviA, basic principle I1, para. 2 (1963). An examination of the legal
incidents and liabilities connected with social property concludes with the statement that
ANTIDUMPING LAW & POLICY
market in the western sense.216 Individual enterprises, and the economy
as a whole, are subject to appreciable state influence, particularly
through the operation of the investment banks and (at least for the
present) an elaborate system of price controls.
Our concern under the antidumping laws is primarily with the
impulses that go into the pricing of products in the Yugoslav domestic
market. Laying aside for the moment measures of state manipulation
of prices, we may identify three key operational principles that go far
to demonstrate that the process whereby Yugoslav enterprises determine
their prices is substantially similar to that of privately-owned enter-
prises in western market-economy countries. These principles reflect
conscious policies that the competitive market should largely replace
planning as the mechanism for determining prices and allocating fac-
tors of production, and that profit earned in that market should be a
legitimate optimizing criterion.
217
The first key element is the concept of worker self-management of
"enterprises in Yugoslavia cannot be considered as State-owned. ... Balog, Foreword
to Laws of Enterprises and Institutions, 13 COL.ErION oF YUGOSLAV LAWS 3, 5 (Eng. lang.
ed. 1966). It appears, however, that the state may claim the assets upon liquidation of the
enterprise, and therefore may be identified as having some incidents of ownership.
PEjovicI, supra note 212, at 29. I was advised by Yugoslav colleagues that enterprises
cannot claim sovereign immunity from suit, and that the assets are subject to execution
upon judgments.
Small businesses (not officially "enterprises'), which employ up to ten persons in
addition to members of the owner's family, may be privately owned in certain fields, such
as crafts and catering. See Balog, supra at 5; Lehrman & Coste, Uses of Adversity, Bmuou's,
May 27, 1968, at 9.
216 See Rusinow, supra note 212, at 5, 8-9, 13. "[T]here is no mechanism (except for
a new law on commercial banks) by which one firm can participate in the management
and distribution of income of another firm." Zupanov, The View from Zagreb, 2 CoLum.
J. WoRLD Bus., Jul.-Aug. 1967, at 67, 69. In the summer of 1968, however, a private bond
issue was floated, the first in postwar Yugoslavia; this step might lead to the establishment
of a stock exchange. See 8 Bus. EUROPE, July 19, 1968, at 226.
Yugoslavia in 1967 promulgated a series of laws designed to permit and attract
foreign private investment, on the basis of joint ventures with Yugoslav enterprises in
which the foreign interest cannot exceed 49%. See Peselj, supra note 215; Import of Foreign
Capital into Yugoslavia, 14 J. YuGosLAV FoRaiG- TstADE No. 2, at 3 (Eng. lang. ed. 1967).
Investments have been slow in coming. See Businesses Avoid Yugoslavia, J. CoMMERcE,
Jan. 24, 1968, at 9; Yugoslavia's Invitation to Foreign Investors: Why Western Firms are
Holding Back, 8 Bus. EuRoPE, Feb. 28, 1968, at 57; Capitalism Finds Yugoslav Haven,
N. Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1968, at 58 (city ed.).
217 See PEjovicH, supra note 212, at 24; Samardzija, supra note 214, at 40-42; Fried-
mann, supra note 212, at 631-83. There is by no means universal agreement among Yugo-
slavs on these principles. See Rusinow, supra note 212, at 5-6; Bicanic, supra note 210, at
646; Anderson, Economic "Reform" in Yugoslavia, 52 CURRENT His'. 215 (1967).
On marketing practices, see Yugoslavia Updates Marketing to Emulate Western Tech-
niques, 8 Bus. EUROPE, Oct. 4, 1968, at 315.
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enterprises. 218 Through an elected Workers' Council, which in turn
chooses an Executive Board and a director, the employees have basic
control of the enterprise for which they work. The significance for our
purposes is not that the blue-collar workers have supremacy over the
supervisory personnel (which at best is only partly and decreasingly
true),219 but rather that the employees as a group enjoy a fundamental
independence from the state in the management of their enterprise.
Second, the worker-managers have an enormous incentive to max-
imize the profits of their enterprise, since they share those profits, and
do so on a basis of self-determination. After taxes and other charges are
covered, the employees are free to allocate the net profit between
reinvestment in the enterprise and increased wages or community bene-
fits for themselves.
220
Third, and most vital here, is the general autonomy of the enter-
prise in arriving at its investment, production, marketing and pricing
decisions.221 Although some legal incidents of ownership of the capital
can be said to be in the state,222 the enterprise's "right of use" conveys
a practical power of autonomous business decision. 223 One of the aims
218 See generally CoNsT. OF YUGOSLAvA, basic principle II para. 5, arts. 9, 90 (1963);
Basic Law of Enterprises arts. 31-76, Fed. Official Gazette of Yugoslavia 17/65 (1965),
reprinted in 13 Cor xCTxON OF YUGOSLAV LAWs 15 (Eng. lang, ed. 1966); Balog, Foreword,
id. at 9-13; Zupanov, supra note 216, at 67, 69-72; PEJOVICH, supra note 212, at 89-93; The
Jugoslav Experiment, 220 ECONOMUs, Jul. 16, 1966, at 237, 239.
219 See Rusinow, supra note 212, at 13, who speaks of the crystallization of two
classes, a genuine working class and a class of "socialist entrepreneurs" (managers and
technicians). Research by a Yugoslav economist indicates that participation in the decision-
making process does not overcome the modem worker's sense of alienation from his
product by the machine, nor does it give him a feeling of power. Zupanov, supra note
216, at 72.
220 See PEjovicH, supra note 212, at 29, 31, 64; Bicanic, supra note 210, at 637-38.
The proportion of net income subject to such worker determination was increased sub-
stantially by the 1965 reforms. Bicanic, supra, at 638; Friedmann, supra note 212, at 633.
This contributed to the inflation that followed. OECD, supra note 212, at 30-31 (1966).
"[Tihe primary goal of each individual enterprise is to maximize the personal income
of its employees." Zupanov, supra note 216, at 68.
221 With the reforms, "commerce ceased to be an apparatus for the distribution of
commodities and became instead an independent economic activity earning profit."
Mirkovic, Price Formation in Commerce, 8 YucosLAv SuRvEy 105 (Eng. lang. ed. 1967).
New investment, which was not autonomous to a high degree until the reforms of
1965, may still be affected by the state through influence in the investment banks. See
pp. 218-19 infra; Rusinow, supra note 212, at 8-9, 13; Samardzija, supra note 214, at 41.
Business autonomy may be impaired by the state when the enterprise suffers con-
tinuing losses; in such cases, the local governmental authorities will dissolve the workers'
council and appoint a trustee with "dictatorial authority." Zupanov, supra note 216, at 70.
222 See note 215 supra.
223 See PEjovicH, supra note 212, at 29-30.
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of the reforms described below has been to depoliticize decision-making
in the management of enterprises.
24
A substantially free and competitive market system has been evolv-
ing throughout the Yugoslav economy. This state of affairs has come
to pass through a series of reforms, commencing in 1950 with initiation
of the basic principle of workers' self-management of enterprises, and
carrying through the 1961 and the 1965 reforms, which are still in the
process of implementation. The 1965 reform particularly has sought to
reinforce past efforts to increase production, stabilize prices and cure
the maldistribution of productive effort, by heightening the autonomy
of enterprises, exposing them to sharper domestic and foreign competi-
tion, and diminishing the role of the state.2 25 (Two specific aims have
been to correct distortions in price relationships between underpriced
products (like raw materials) and consumer goods, and to bring prices
generally into line with the international market.)2 2 6 The concept of
central planning has experienced a reciprocal decline, Planning now
exists, according to the 1963 Constitution, primarily "in order to attain
self-management and to realize the individual and common interests of
the working people .... "227
224 See Bicanic, supra note 210, at 636-37; Samardzija, supra note 214, at 40. PEjovicIT,
supra note 212, at 91, states that the workers' council is the only important Yugoslav
socio-economic institution which is not ordinarily controlled by the Communist Party
from within. The local government does, however, have some direct influence on the
enterprise. Id. at 93.
225 Bicanic, supra note 210, at 634; Friedmann, supra note 212, at 631-33; PEjovicH,
supra note 212, at 25; Ivanovic, Successful Implementation of Short-Term Objectives of
the Reform, 14 J. YuGosrLv FOREIGN TADE, No. 4, at 3 (Eng. lang. ed. 1967).
226 See Bicanic, supra note 210, at 638, 641; Friedmann, supra note 212, at 631-32;
OECD, supra note 212, at 8 (1966); ECONOMIST, supra note 218, at 238, col. 1. "[The
reform's] idea, in a nutshell, is to recast the country's economy with a view to its inclu-
sion in the international division of labour." Spasic, Yugoslav Manufacturers Interest in
Industrial Cooperation with Foreign Firms is Greatly Stimulated by their Ability to Make
Free Decisions Regarding Such Arrangements, 13 J. YuGosLAv FOREIGN TRADE, No. 3, at 11
(Eng. lang. ed. 1966).
Yugoslavia's recent adoption of its own antidumping law, which generally conforms
to GATT standards, is further evidence of the openness of that country's economy. Decree
on the Conditions and Procedure of Introduction of Supplementary Customs Duties and
Compensation Charges, Fed. Official Gazette of Yugoslavia 33/67 (1967), synopsized in 18
THE NEw YUGosLAv LAW 117-18 (Eng. lang. ed. 1967). One of the reasons for adopting this
legislation is that the "liberalization of trade has cut the power of state buying organisa-
tions." ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW: YUGOSLAvIA, Sept.
1967, at 12. "Under central planning [there is] . . . airtight protection to domestic indus-
tries. Hence, Communist countries need no antidumping legislation." Wilczynski, supra
note 164, at 251.
Yugoslavia is also seeking ties with the European Economic Community. N. Y. Times,
Sept. 16, 1968, at 5, col. 3 (city ed.).
227 CONSr. oF YUGOSLAViA, basic principle III para. 7 (1963). See generally Djordjevic,
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The reforms have been described as "a staggering essay in Man-
chester liberalism, .... accepting the market as the master, instead of
the bureaucrat. " 228 But an authoritative commentator has cautioned
that these phenomena do not represent a return to capitalism, nor do
they necessarily lead to a retreat from authoritarianism. Rather, the
Yugoslav metamorphosis reflects a recognition that much of western
economics is apolitical and can be harnessed in the interests of economic
growth without abandoning "socialism.1
2 9
Where the enterprises possess the incentive, the independence and
the power to act autonomously, the market is thrust into a central role
in organizing the economy, and the sovereignty of the consumer asserts
itself.23 0 It should follow that prices will be determined in much the
same way as in any western free-market economy. Although in a broad
sense prices are so formed in Yugoslavia, there are difficulties with this
inference.
First, the availability of funds for new investment seems to remain
subject to a certain amount of political control. Apart from reinvest-
ment of profits, such funds are almost exclusively available from the
investment banks, which therefore can function by their choice of
investments as the "controllers of economic development." 231 Although
the 1965 reforms aimed at reducing the degree to which investment
The Yugoslav Planning System, 17 THx Naw YucosLAv LAw 3 (Eng. lang. ed. 1966);
A. WATEsrON, supra note 212.
"[Yugoslavia's] planners swing less weight than the U. S. President's Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers." Burck, supra note 214, at 128. Planning is now more a chart to measure
economic development, built by aggregating projections submitted by enterprises, than a
directive device to control the economy. Samardzija, supra note 214, at 41, 43-44.
228 220 ECONOMIST, supra note 218, at 237. "They have seized upon the competitive
free enterprise system as the best instrument to this end with an avidity unknown since
Adam Smith's day." Rusinow, supra note 212, at 15.
229 Rusinow, supra note 212, at 3-4. Cf. SAMUELSON, supra note 194, at 611-18.
Yugoslav economists, taking the Soviet Union and their own country as examples,
concluded almost from the beginning that bureaucracy was the major obstacle to economic
efficiency. By 1948, when Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, the move to
decentralize had already manifested itself. Burck, supra note 214, at 128-33.
The situation is not without its irony:
There they stand, the socialist entrepreneurs (with their party cards tucked in
their pockets), sounding rather like the National Association of Manufacturers
in their demands for lower taxes and less government interference, so that they
can get on with the business of building socialism by making profits and investing
them sensibly.
Rusinow, supra, at 15. See also Zupanov, supra note 216, at 70.
230 Under the reforms, advertising revived strongly by 1957, PEjovicH, supra note 212,
at 30, and the use of trade-marks and licensing of patent rights re-emerged..Wxva ToN,
supra note 212, at 57.
231 Friedmann, sura note 212, at 634.
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credits were subject to political rather than economic determination, 23 2
the relevant governmental organizations are participants (lbeit with
limited voting power) in the investment banks,233 and it is believed that
political influences continue to predominate.2 34 If in fact new invest-
ments are subject to effective governmental control, that control could
affect particular product prices and the price relationships among
products, by regulating entry into production lines and by affording or
denying the financial means to enlarge production.235
Second, and probably more impOrtaftt, the periods both before and
since the reform year of 1965 have been matked by quite comprehen-
sive use of price controls238 The nature and incidence of such controls
have varied considerably from year to year, reflecting the variety of
reasons for imposing them, The chief purpose in tecent years has been
to curb inflation induced by 6Vereager reinvestment ald by rising
incomes; a general price freeze was imposed in fact, just before the
1965 reforms were introduced2S7 A related problem continues to be
that of monopoly pricing power, The Yugoslav economy may simply
be too small to call forth enough producers to create an effectively
competitive market in certain products, 238 or monopolistic structures
may hold over from the days of state organization of the economy; in
either case, high prices can be charged unless controls are imposed.23 9
A different reason for price fixing or price controls is to cotrect (or in
232 Rusinow, supra note 212, at 13, 8-9; see Yugoslavian Economic Reform Transfers
Investment Decisions from Political to Business Arena, 72 INT'L COM NRCE, Oct. 3, 1966,
at 80. Political influence has included the fostering of "political factories," as by extending
credits to found new enterprises in less-developed areas when strict etonomic considerations
would not justify doing so; the phenomena of "log rolling" and the "pork barrel" have
played an important part. See Bicanic, supra note 210, at 640; Rusinowi supra note 212,
at 9. In order to remain in operation under the harsher competitive conditions brought by
the reforms, political factories have sought coritintied subsidization. Anderson, supra note
217, at 215.
233 Friedmnann sttpa note 212, at 633.
234 See Lehrman & Coste, supra note 215, at 24; iusin6w, supra note 212, at 9, i3.
2365 The freedom of enterprises to reinvest their earnings, when coupled With the
inability to invest in other industries, ZupanoV, quoted note 216 supra, may lead to a
misallocation of investment. 220 ECONOMIST, supra note 28, at 239; OECD, supra n6te
212, at 7 (1966).
236 See generally Mirkovic, supra note 221: PEJ.oIC, sutpfa fiote 212, at 23-26; MAcx-
siet, sup-a note 212, at 64-65; WA SaESTON, supfa note 212, at 55-59.
23t OECD, supra note 212, at 7-8 (1966); Rusihow, supra note 212, at 14.
238 See Dragicevic, supra note 211, at 77; OECD, supra note 212, at 1 (1966).
239 See, e.g., Burck, supra note 214, at 133; Dragicevic, supra note 211, at 77-80.
Apparently, however, Yugoslavia does have some sort of an antitrust law. PEjovicH, supra




some cases, to maintain) uneconomic price relationships built into the
earlier statist economy.
240
The various price measures of recent years have called for fixed
prices (as for utility services, transportation, tobacco, housing, and some
agricultural products), 241 minimum guaranteed prices and other arrang-
ments for agricultural produce, 242 notification and justification to gov-
ernment authorities before effectuating price increases, 243 fixed margins
of profit or markup at the distribution level,244 and (most generally and
most important for present purposes) price ceilings.
245
The 1967 Act on Formation and Social Control of Prices2 46 affirms
the principle of autonomous determination of prices247 and sets forth
the circumstances in which price controls may be imposed. Govern-
mental organs are to utilize direct controls only where "stable relation-
ships on the market" cannot be preserved by indirect measures affecting
such matters as monetary and currency activity, credit, foreign trade
and exchange, and the overall level of spending.24 The Act provides
for the establishment of maximum prices, for registration of prices, for
maintenance of current prices, and for setting the method of forming
prices, as well as for guaranteed and minimum prices in agriculture.249
It also allows enterprises by agreement among themselves, subject to
the approval of the price commission, to revise prices that have been
maintained at current levels by regulation.
250
At the beginning of 1968, roughly half of all manufactured goods
were subject to price controls.251 Although price control measures are
240 See Rusinow, supra note 212, at 11. The 1947-51 Five-Year Plan had "relegated to
a second plane the indispensable economic laws and militated against the interest of the
producers and their organizations." Djordjevic, supra note 227, at 9.
241 MAczsicss, supra note 212, at 65; PEJOvicH, supra note 212, at 25.
242 MAcESICH, supra note 212, at 65; WATERSTON, supra note 212, at 59.
243 Mirkovic, supra note 221, at 106; Pajovca, supra note 212, at 24; WATERSTON,
supra note 212, at 59; MAcEsiCH, supra note 212, at 65.
244 Mirkovic, supra note 221, at 107; PEJOVICH, supra note 212, at 24-25.
245 Mirkovic, supra note 221, at 107; PEJOVICH, supra note 212, at 24-25; WATERSTON,
supra note 212, at 59.
246 Fed. Official Gazette of Yugoslavia 12/67, 278, summarized in 18 THE NEw
YucosLAv LAw 109-10 (Eng. lang. ed. 1967).
247 "Working organizations form the prices of their products and services inde-
pendently according to the conditions of the market." Act on the Formation and Social
Control of Prices, id., art. 1, para. 1. See also id. art. 8. But: "[T]he Federation has an
influence on the shaping of market conditions which make it possible for working organi-
zations to form their prices independently." Id. art. 2, para. 1. "The prices of products and
services are subject to social control." Id. art. 3, para. 1 (unofficial translations).
248 Id. arts. 4, 5.
249 Id. arts. 16, 17.
250 Id. arts. 27-34.
251 Francis, Yugoslavia, 74 INT'L COMMERCE, Jan. 15, 1968, at 34.
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officially regarded as temporary expedients, 252 the on-again-off-again
pattern of the recent past and the continuation of inflationary pressures
indicate that they are likely to persist, particularly so long as certain
fundamental paradoxes in Yugoslavia's economic development remain
unresolved.253
Price controls affect the very nexus of a market economy, and
inevitably lead over time to a distortion of price relationships and to
a misallocation of resources by affecting the profitability of investment.
In circumstances where the extensive use of price control joins with the
existence of other devices by which the state guides the economy, it
becomes difficult to assess the degree to which that economy is subject
to state control or is characterized by market autonomy.254
D. Does Yugoslavia Have a "State-Controlled Economy"?
There are two reasons for asking whether the economy of Yugo-
slavia is pervasively influenced by state control. The first arises from the
Treasury practice of resorting to a third-country price as the measure
of fair value whenever the exporting country has a "controlled econ-
omy";255 I shall briefly consider the decided cases. The second stems
from my proposal that, instead of automatically taking a third-country
price, the Treasury use the home-market price if that price can be
validated by use of the "market-basket" technique of price-ratio com-
parison. For the purpose of deciding whether there exists an element of
state influence that would require the validation of the home-market
price, I have suggested that such influence be presumed where the
economy as a whole is subject to substantial state intervention, even if
the product in question is free of direct control. 25" I shall consider
whether this presumption should be made in cases involving the
products of Yugoslavia.
1. Treatment of Yugoslav Products under the Treasury's
"State-Control" Test
With qualifications that will be noted, the decided cases indicate
that the Treasury does not treat Yugoslavia as a "controlled economy."
Of the four reported decisions, three bespeak an apparently unhesitant
252 Act on the Formation and Social Control of Prices, supra note 246, art. 35;
Mirkovic, supra note 221, at 107.
253 See Rusinow, supra note 212, at 11, 18; ECONOMIST INTELLGFCcE UNIT, QuARTERLY
ECONOMIC REvrEw: YUGOSLAVIA, Dec. 1967, at 1-2.
254 See Zupanov, supra note 216, at 67 (a "baffling" question).
255 Regulations § 53.5(b). See pp. 200-05 supra.
256 See pp. 210-11 supra.
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readiness to apply the normal tests of fair value (home-market price,
export price and constructed value), none of which would have been
used if the Yugoslav economy were regarded as controlled.
In the first two Yugoslav cases the Treasury employed the normal
home-market price test, making no mention of an issue as to whether
the Yugoslav economy was controlled. In Portland Cement from Yugo-
slavia, the opinion noted simply that the "quantity sold in the home
market was adequate to furnish a basis for comparison." 257 Again, in
Wooden Coat Hangers from Yugoslavia, the comparison was made with
"the home market price at which identical hangers were sold in Yugo-
slavia.'1258 Neither decision evinced concern with the conditions under
which home sales were priced.
Although no Yugoslav case has measured fair value by the price at
which the product is exported to countries other than the United
States, language in two opinions indicates a readiness to employ this
export price test. The Wooden Coat Hangers decision, by mentioning
that the exporter sold more of its product at home than at export,
clearly implied that the export price test would have been used, under
the procedure usual for non-communist countries, if the large prepon-
derance of sales other than to the United States had been made at export
rather than in the Yugoslav home market.29 In the interesting case of
Headboards from Yugoslavia,260 the Treasury noted the complete ab-
sence of any sales at export (as well as of home-market sales) before
moving on to use a constructed value.
In the Headboards case, the Treasury computed the constructed
value on the normal basis of the actual costs, expenses and profits of
making the product in Yugoslavia, and observed: "In past cases involv,
ing other merchandise from Yugoslavia, such data were found to be
consistent with that pertaining to imports from other countries. 20 1
This picture is clouded somewhat by the perplexing decision of
Copper Sheets from Yugoslavia.2 6 2 Inconsistently with the pattern of
the other Yugoslav cases, the Treasury applied the third-country price
test ("home market value in Western European countries"). But it did
not approach the price comparison in the same way as it has consistently
done in cases involving other communist countries. First, it began its
opinion by mentioning the absence of home-market sales of similar
257 28 Fed. Reg. 41 (1963).
266 29 Fed. Reg. 2952 (1964).
259 See Regulations § 53.4(b); prior regulations, 19 C.F.R. § 14.7(a)(2) (1967).
260 30 Fed. Reg. 8016 (1965).
261 Id. No citation to "past cases" was given in the opinion,
262 29 Fed. Reg. 8149 (1964).
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copper sheets in Yugoslavia; in the other communist cases the existence
of home-market sales is ignored. Second, the Treasury in the Copper
Sheets case made an alternate reckoning of constructed value by the
method usual in the non-communist cases: computation of costs, ex-
penses and profit. Although the opinion declared that the alternative
calculation was "not regarded as controlling," one wonders why it was
made at all if there were not some doubt about using the third-country
price test.
The Copper Sheets decision is not inconsistent with the conclusion
that the Treasury will use home-market price (or the price at export
to countries other than the United States) in cases where there are in
fact such sales in Yugoslavia. But where such sales are absent a con-
structed value must be used, and the question is whether to calculate
it in the usual way from home-economy cost, expense and profit figures,
or to construct it by reference to a third-country price in the manner
observed where the exporting economy is "controlled." The usual
method of computing home-economy figures was followed in the Head-
boards case, but this may have been done for the reason simply that no
third-country market in similar headboards existed.263 Where a third-
country market did exist, in the Copper Sheets case, the Treasury looked
first to the third-country price. That approach may reflect a view, based
on the nature of the Yugoslav economy in 1964, that a value constructed
from input figures found in the Yugoslav economy was a less reliable
measure than a price drawn from the freer economies of Western
Europe.
Even so, the Copper Sheets case treated Yugoslavia differently from
other communist countries. And the other three cases go far to show
that Yugoslav exports are regarded as the products of a non-controlled
economy. But it remains to consider more closely the extent to which
the Treasury should measure the fair value of Yugoslav products by
the same tests it applies to the products of non-communist countries.
2. Sufficiency of State Control in Yugoslavia to Require
Validation of Home Prices
Under its approach of deciding simply whether the entire economy
was or was not controlled, and within the limits upon the utility of
such an approach, the Treasury may have been warranted in treating
Yugoslavia as a non-controlled country. Even at the time these cases
were decided (1963 to 1965), the Yugoslav economy was governed by
203 The opinion stated that "neither such nor similar headboards are imported [into
the United States] from other countries." 30 Fed. Reg. 8016 (1965).
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the market to an extent sufficient to justify declaring it non-controlled.
But it should be clear what the Treasury was deciding under that
approach. To a large exent it was determining whether to use home-
market prices or third-country prices as the measure of fair value for
all potential imports from that country. But, if the country were treated
as controlled, the third-country prices used would not be validated by
any reference to the exporting economy. And if the country were
treated as non-controlled, the home-market prices used would not be
validated by any reference to external free markets. The Treasury's
approach was a crude one because, for a country that stood near the
borderline, either answer was likely to produce imprecise measures of
fair value, at least with regard to particular products. The Treasury
has in effect been making a rough guess, for each country, as to whether
the inaccuracies of third-country prices would be less than the inaccu-
racies of home-market prices when applied to the full array of the
country's exportable products.
Under the suggested approach, the Treasury should first consider
whether the home-market price of the particular product appears to be
affected by state control, in which event it usually should be vali-
dated. The distinction between generally controlled and generally free
economies is retained only for the purpose of raising presumptions
about the indirect influence of state control, and therefore about the
need for validation. Here the purpose of the "controlled economy"
distinction is different from that for which it has previously been drawn
by the Treasury, and the criteria and results may accordingly differ.
This observation is especially pertinent to a country like Yugoslavia,
which exhibits an appreciable current practice and a greater history of
state intervention in the economy. The issue is whether the regime of
present control and the legacies of past control are so pervasive in their
effects that home prices are likely to be distorted even where they are
not directly influenced by the state. If so, Yugoslavia should be regarded
as generally controlled for this purpose, and its home-market prices
should not be used to measure fair value until they have been validated.
One might well argue that state interposition in Yugoslavia is not
likely to distort the prices generated by the market-oriented economy
that exists under present liberal policies. The autonomy of enterprises
appears to parallel that of western economies. While the capital of
enterprises can be viewed as being state-owned (in light of the juridical
incidents of "social property"), Yugoslav enterprises are not state-
managed or even subject to substantial central planning.2 64 In a sense
264 "Enterprises are independent and have the status of a legal person in the full
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sufficient for present purposes, they may be said to be privately man-
aged; the state's interest in the capital becomes immaterial. Enterprises
make their own investment, production and distribution decisions,
pursuing maximum profits in a competitive market. A market com-
prised of such sellers is capable of yielding economically valid price
relationships. Further, since the profits and losses of enterprises inure
to the employees, the danger of the state's absorbing losses from arti-
ficially low home prices seems absent.
But so long as the government continues to impose an extensive
regime of price control, it seems to me that the Yugoslav economy can-
not yet be presumed to generate economically valid price relationships
to a degree sufficient to dispense with validation of home prices. This
is not because of the extent of such price regulation-indeed, at pres-
ent, the reach of price control in Great Britain seems more sweeping. 265
The critical fact is a history of price regulation in Yugoslavia that has
continued without significant respite through the entire period in
which the program of worker-management and enterprise autonomy
has been unfolding. There is no doubt that the continuous application
of price controls has carried forward a substantial legacy of price and
investment alignments established under the command economy of
earlier years.266 The nation has never really had a period of free pricing,
whereunder investment and production patterns could respond to
market-determined price relationships. Thus, despite its generally liber-
alized character, the Yugoslav economy is vitally different from that of
the United Kingdom, which (we may assume) evolved its present pat-
tern through the workings of a far freer market. Although the Yugo-
slav government has been taking administrative measures specifically
designed to correct distortions inherited from the statist economic sys-
tem, 267 thereby hastening the day when price controls can be removed
and the economy can operate both freely and rationally, such action is
after all the work of the state.
sense of the word. They are not assigned planned tasks by the Government." Balog,
supra note 218, at 6.
265 In its effort to stanch inflation and to protect the benefits of its 1967 devaluation
of the pound, the United Kingdom has imposed a virtually all-embracing regime of price
ceilings as well as extensive control measures of other sorts. See BRITISH INFORMATION
SERViCEFS, 7 BRITISH RxcoRD, Apr. 25, 1968, at 1-2. Yugoslav price controls at present are
only selective. See notes 248, 251 supra.
266 See Rusinow, supra note 212, at 11; Friedmann, supra note 212, at 632-33;
PEjovicH, supra note 212, at 25; OECD, supra note 212, at 8 (1966); Bicanic, supra note
210, at 641.
267 OECD, supra note 212, at 8 (1966); Friedmann, supra note 212, at 632-33;
ECONOMIST, supra note 218, at 238.
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It seems necessary to conclude, for the present at least, that home-
market prices cannot be relied upon to serve as an economically sound
index of fair value. For purposes of the presumption as to the need to
validate home prices, then, Yugoslavia should be treated the same as
other communist countries. Since Yugoslavia's market is far freer than
those of other Eastern European countries, however, it seems likely that
her home-market prices would in fact prove valid more frequently
than those of the other communist nations. In any event, the situation
may soon change. If the present liberalizing trends are extended into
the future, and if price controls can generally be lifted (as the govern-
ment is striving to do),268 the resulting market may well be sufficiently
free to enable the Treasury to reverse the presumption.
The impact of state influence through the investment banks is
hard to gauge factually and difficult to appraise for its relevance to the
question of the extent to which price relationships may be distorted.
Controls by the banks over the direction of new investment may not
in themselves constitute any higher quantum of state interference than
do the monetary and fiscal devices employed by western governments.
But their importance is magnified by the absence of alternative sources
of investment funds in Yugoslavia. Existing enterprises of course can
reinvest their profits, but new entry into industry depends heavily upon
the cooperation of the investment banks.269 To the extent a bank's pat-
tern of investment reflects a state influence, and varies the pattern that
a freer market would engender, it will misallocate factors of production
and therefore distort price relationships. This form of state control
appears therefore to reinforce that exerted by price regulation. But
state influence through the investment banks appears to be of a rela-
tively low order of magnitude. When price controls are removed it may
well be proper, for purposes of the presumption about the reliability
of prices, to treat Yugoslavia as an essentially free economy despite the
practices of the banks.
E. Products Subjected to Direct State Control in a Generally Free
Economy
When the exporting economy is essentially free, the Treasury seems
invariably to measure fair value by use of the home-market price (or
other "normal" test), without regard for the possible influence of the
state upon the specific product or its price.270 Under the approach I am
268 See notes 247-48 supra; Friedmann, supra note 212, at 633.
269 Friedmann, supra note 212, at 633-34.
270 See note 205 supra.
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advocating, the fact that an economy is found to be generally free gives
rise to a presumption that its home-market prices will reliably measure
fair value, but the presumption will be set aside if it appears that the
product in question is directly influenced by measures of state inter-
vention, I will briefly consider the ways in which the Treasury, to im-
plement its 1968 regulation concerning state control, 271 might take
account of certain forms of state intervention found in exporting econo-
mies that are generally free,
1. Price controls
When first imposed, a general freeze of all prices brings about no
new distortion of existing market relationships. 272 The continued use
of otherwise appropriate home-market prices to measure fair value
seems proper for at least a short period after imposition of the price
halt. Over time, however, shifting patterns of demand and cost will
render the frozen matrix of prices increasingly untrustworthy as a
gauge of yalue. A question then arises about the extent to which home
prices, before they are used as the standard of fair value, should be val-
idated by a comparison of home-market price ratios with those found
in economies where the product is not controlled 27
Selective price regulation-aimed at restraining inflation or at
realigning the relative prices of different goods-will have a strong
tendency to distort market relationships,2 74 If the controlled price is
fixed it will lose a market contact with uncontrolled prices as the latter
fluctuate. Where the control is in the form of a ceiling and the product
is sold at the ceiling price, that price may become an abnormally low
one as other prices rise in response to inflation. Selective controls could
probably be regarded as non-distorting only where they are imposed
upon a broad range of basic commodities and raw materials, in an
effort to hold down the prices of finished goods as well. In such cir-
cumstances it may be permissible to use a controlled home-market price
as the index of fair value, at least for some time after the imposition
of controls, without validating that price. In other situations, selective
-271 Regulations § 53.5(b), The regulation is captionied "Merchandise from controlled
economy rountry," but its text is sibjet to the interpretation, here advocated, that an
evaluation should be made of the degree to which the particular product is affected by
"control" in the exporting economy, whether that economy is generally "controlled" or
"Ifree." See pp. 20542 supra.
272 rThe general price freeze of course carries forw.axd any pre-existing distortions.
See note 266 supra and accompanying text.
273 See pp. 207-11 supra.
274 The distorting effect (if any) of controls aimed at holding down monopoly prices
probably can be discussed only in terms of specific information about particular cases.
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controls will gradually render the controlled prices unreliable as pre-
cise indicators of value; the question of validation is again presented.
Where the controls take the form of price ceilings, the existence
of dumping can often be accurately proven without having to validate
the home price. In the common situation where the actual home price
stands at the controlled ceiling level, the Treasury should accept the
controlled home price without validation when that price is higher
than the price at which the allegedly dumped goods are sold to the
United States (that is, when the price comparison shows dumping
sales). But when it stands below the price to the American importer,
the controlled home price should not be used to measure fair value
until it has been validated. Although this distinction may appear in-
vidious, it is warranted on the fundamental ground that fair value
should be measured as closely as possible by reference to market forces.
We may consider the case of a producer who sells in his home mar-
ket at the ceiling price and exports to the United States at a lower
price. From these facts we do not know how much higher a price the
market would allow him to charge at home if there were no controls.
But we do know that otherwise-free market forces at home enable
him to maintain a price which (although confined by the ceiling) is
higher than that at which he sells to the United States. To establish
the existence of dumping sales, this is all the Treasury needs to know.
Validation of the home price, which in the absence of controls could
only be higher, is unnecessary.
2 75
Consider now a producer who exports to the United States at a
higher price than the ceiling price at which he sells in his home mar-
ket. Here, because controls keep down the home price, we cannot know
whether a free market would bring that price to a level higher than the
price at which he is selling to the United States. The controlled home
price does not reflect the operation of market forces within the price
range relevant to the Treasury's price comparison. The home price
consequently should not be taken as the index of fair value unless it
can be shown to be valid at its controlled level.
Products that are not controlled under the selective price regula-
tions may properly be valued at their home-market price. An exception
should be made, however, where the price of an important raw material
is controlled at an artificially low level, conferring a sort of a subsidy
upon the finished product whose price is uncontrolled. Merchandise
for which a ceiling price is established, but whose actual price has been
275 See note 203 supra.
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stabilized by the market at a lower level, may be valued in the same
fashion as uncontrolled products.
Where the home price is fixed (so that it cannot be lowered or
raised), it would be an inappropiate measure of fair value, regardless
of whether it stood at a level higher or lower than the price for export
to the United States. In neither case could the Treasury gauge the
extent to which it reflected market forces (except perhaps for a short
time after the price was first controlled, provided it was set at its
former free-market level).
2. Subsidy to Production
The allegedly dumped goods may come from an enterprise that
experiences lowered overall costs, resulting from a continuing direct
subsidy by the state, or from past direct subsidies such as those con-
ferred at the time of initial investment. In other instances, the producer
may receive an indirect subsidy, in the form (for example) of cheap
electricity rates from the state-operated power authority. State sub-
ventions that tend to lower the home-market price should be taken into
account when considering whether to measure fair value by reference
to that price.2 76 Where the subsidy is traceable on a measurable per-
unit basis, the home price should be appropriately adjusted to ascertain
the fair value.2 7 7 Similarly, adjustment may enable use of the con-
276 We are concerned here, of course, with the effect of the subsidy upon the home
price in the country of export, rather than with its effect upon the price at which the
product may be sold to the United States. But such subsidies also raise the question
whether the products of the subsidized producers, when exported to the United States,
should be subjected to countervailing duties under the anti-bounty statute, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1803 (1964), discussed in note 16 supra. The countervailing duty is ordinarily imposed
against merchandise that is directly subsidized by the government of the exporting country
upon the occasion of its export. The statutory language "any bounty or grant upon the
manufacture or production or export of any article or merchandise," however, is not
confined to direct export subsidies and could be applied to the more general sorts of
subsidies mentioned in the text. See 38 Op. ATr'y GEN. 489, 491 (1936); Ehrenhaft, supra
note 164, at 55. The extent to which the Treasury may have applied the statute, in cases
where there was no direct subsidy conditioned upon exportation, is difficult to discern
from the decisions; two cases in which it may have done so are T.D. 53,182, 88 TRas. DEC.
16 (1953), and T.D. 50,093, 75 TREms. DEc. 804 (1940). "The absence of any reports from the
Treasury Department as to the basis on which its determinations of the existence of
subsidization are made, [sic] it is difficult, if not impossible, to analyze the administration
of section 303." HousE WAYS & MEANS SuncoArar., supra note 178, at 95. The antidumping
laws, however, remain applicable. See id. at 91. Except where direct export subsidies are
involved, use of the antidumping laws (which require a finding of injury) would more
closely serve a balanced trade policy than use of the anti-bounty statute (which requires
no injury investigation).
277 The regulations have failed to include provisions that would allow adjustments
for subsidies to the production of the exported product (or for subsidies to the produc-
1969]
GORNELL LAW REVIEW
structed value test. Where the subsidy is not sufficiently quantifiable
to allow adjustments, however, the Treasury should determine whether
the home-market price is higher than the price at which the product is
sold to the United States. If so, the existence of dumping sales is estab-
lished by the home price without the need to validate it. Market forces
have kept the home price high enough, in spite of the subsidy, to show
dumping. But the home price should be validated whenever it is lower
than the level of the price at export to the United States, since there is
no way of telling whether it would stand below that level in the absence
of subsidy. An exception to the validation requirement might be made
where the subsidy has been extended to only one of several producers,
and competition among them has generated a market price unaffected
by the subsidy.
3. State-Induced Private Monopoly
The exporter's enjoyment of a position of monopoly should not
in itself militate against use of the normal fair value tests. It is true
that the capacity to exact high monopoly prices may sometimes re-
sult from state action-such as the outright legal protection of the pro-
ducer against competition, or (in Yugoslavia) the refusal of state-influ-
enced investment banks to extend the credits necessary to found
competing enterprises. But monopoly of this or of any other sort carries
with it one of the fundamental evils the Antidumping Act is designed
to forestall-the potential "subsidization" of exports by the returns
from high home-market prices.278 Use of the high home price to gauge
value simply fulfills a principal objective of the Act. Validation is un-
necessary.
4. State-Owned Enterprises
Different considerations prevail with respect to enterprises owned
and operated by the exporting state. The risk of distortion is not so
much that the enterprise's prices will be abnormally high, but rather
that for non-economic reasons they may be set too low, presenting the
possibility of loss-absorption by the state. Since the state may set them
with reference to considerations other than those of the market, the
prices of state enterprises should not be used to measure fair value
unless they can be validated. If the state enterprise is only one of several
tion of raw materials, power and the like, which lessen the price to the exporting producer
of his input factors). While §§ 202, 205 and 206 of the Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 161, 164i 165
(1964), provide for making certain other adjustments in ascertaining fair value, they are
silent with regard to subsidies.
278 See pp. 168-69 supra.
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competing producers (as is the Renault enterprise in France), however,
there may be a market-determined home ptke which tan properly be
taken as the index of fair value.27 9
To maintain fall faith with the premises upon which the Act rests,
every value determination should be guided by the most exact avail-
able free-market criteria. Only then can there be confidence that the law
will regularly admit the fairly-priced and discourage the unfairly-priced
imports. The world must be dealt with as it is found; when state inter-
vention skews the normal guidelines of value, a sophisticated adapta-
tion of free-market standards, perhaps in the fashion suggested here,
is needed to keep the value determination consonant with the pirposes
of the law.
279 Government-owned entdrprises i niany tountties art increasingly being operated
by reference to commercial rather than political considerations. Rukeyser, Creeping Capi-
talism in Government Corporations, 78 FORTuNE, Sept. 15, 1968, at 124.
